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Jurisdiction
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).
Statement of the Issues and Standards of Review
Westgate Resorts, Ltd. invited a number of people to Park City to hear a sales
presentation for Westgate timeshares in exchange for a gift certificate worth $500 for
airline travel to, and hotel accommodations in, Anaheim, California. The people
Westgate invited to the presentation were those with sufficient means to purchase a
timeshare, including engineers, university professors, sales managers, and advertising
consultants. Some of those people found the gift certificates difficult to redeem.
Shaun Adel, a disgruntled former Westgate contractor fired for falsifying sales
records, stole Westgate files containing contact information of gift certificate recipients.
Mr. Adel then formed Consumer Protection Group, LLC (CPG) for the sole purpose of
obtaining from certificate recipients claims against Westgate related to certificate
redemption and then prosecuting those claims. To obtain the claims, CPG agreed the
recipients would pay nothing and do nothing (not even participate in the litigation) to
prosecute their claims but would receive 50% of any recovery. In all, CPG was assigned
approximately 500 claims from people who had heard a Westgate sales presentation.
But instead of trying the purchased claims separately or certifying a class of claim
holders, all 500 claims were joined in this lawsuit because, and only because, they had
been purchased by, and were owned by, one party—CPG, an entity that neither suffered
harm nor had a claim against Westgate. CPG's purchased claims were diverse, ranging
from claims of people who never tried to redeem a certificate; to people who tried but did
not redeem a certificate; to people who tried, redeemed the certificate, and traveled to

Anaheim. Thus, any consolidation of claims for trial presented challenges. Instead of
consolidating claims with similar fact patterns to minimize prejudice, however, the court
consolidated 15 claims with different fact patterns, resulting in an array of "test cases"
CPG hoped would indicate the value of all remaining claims and facilitate settlement.
The eventual result was predictable and prejudicial. The jury awarded each of the
15 claimants1 between $5 and $550 in compensatory damages and identical punitive
damages of $66,666.67, for a total of $1 million in punitive damages awards.
Extrapolating the punitive awards for those 15 claims to all of the 500 assigned claims
would result in more than $33 million in "punishment" imposed on Westgate as a result
of the difficulty some people experienced in redeeming the $500 certificates—certificates
provided to them by an independent contractor hired by Westgate.
The way the claims were consolidated and tried and the characteristics of the
jury's punitive damages awards together demonstrate that with each separate punitive
damage award the jury punished Westgate for conduct directed to the other 14 claimants
and to third parties not before the court, something constitutionally forbidden.
Separately, the amount of the individual punitive damages awards, which range from 121
to 13,333 times larger than all compensatory damages, and range from 1,333 and 13,333
times compensatory damages from fraud, are grossly excessive.
Issue 1: Whether Westgate was prejudiced by the trial court's manner of
consolidating disparate consumer claims for trial, exacerbated by the trial court's refusal
to strike statements by counsel for CPG that invited the jury to punish Westgate for
conduct directed at other claimants whose claims were not then before the court.
1

Although the trial began with 16 claims, Westgate obtained judgment as a matter of
law on one claim, leaving 15 claims that went to the jury. (R. 4933-34.)

Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to consolidate is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 325 P.2d 258, 259 (Utah 1958).
Preservation: R. 2795-808; 4224-70; 4897-901.
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant JNOV or remittitur with
regard to the punitive damages awards where (i) the amount of the award is
constitutionally excessive and the result of passion and prejudice and (ii) the jury
punished Westgate for harm allegedly suffered by third parties.
Standard of Review: On appeal, a party is entitled to de novo review of the
constitutionality of a punitive damages award and its excessiveness under state law.
Cooper Indus.. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001); Smith v.
Fairfax Realty, Inc.. 2003 UT 41, f 31 & n.13, 82 P.3d 1064.
Preservation: R. 4861-81.
Determinative Provisions
The following determinative provisions are set forth at Addendum I.
U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 2
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-17 (2001)
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19 (2001)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1605 (2001)
Utah R. Civ. P. 42
Utah R. Civ. P. 59

Statement of the Case
I.

Nature of the Case
This case initially arose when Westgate invited people who could afford to

purchase timeshare properties to attend a sales presentation for those timeshares in
exchange for, in addition to other gifts, a certificate worth approximately $500 for airfare
to and lodging in Anaheim, California. Westgate hired a reputable, well-known
independent contractor that specializes in advertising such certificate programs. Some
people found that the independent contractor made it difficult to redeem the certificates.
Shaun Adel, a Westgate marketing contractor, became disgruntled when he was
terminated for attempting to defraud Westgate by lying about the number of people he
had solicited to attend sales presentations, solicitations for which he claimed a
commission. Adel then stole confidential Westgate records with contact information for
people who had attended such sales presentations. Westgate sought injunctive relief
against Mr. Adel, which the trial court granted after characterizing Mr. Adel's actions as
"wrongful." (R. 2349.) Mr. Adel nonetheless used the stolen contact information to
enable his entity, CPG, to purchase claims from certificate recipients. Mr. Adel formed
CPG for the sole purpose of obtaining and prosecuting claims against Westgate. In
exchange for assigning these claims, CPG offered to give the certificate recipients, at no
cost to them, 50% of any recovery. CPG eventually obtained assignments of nearly 500
such claims. This appeal is from a trial involving 15 of those 500 claims.
The proceedings involving those 15 claims raise a number of issues. First, the trial
court chose not to consolidate 15 similar claims for trial, but instead consolidated 15
claims with disparate facts. Some of the 15 claimants never tried to redeem a certificate,

others tried unsuccessfully to redeem a certificate, and yet others actually redeemed a
certificate, one of them traveling to Anaheim. Yet because the disparate claims were
tried together, the jury treated all of them the same and awarded each of the 15 claimants
the exact same punitive damages award—$66,666.67.
Second, the punitive damages awards violate the federal due process clause and
Utah law specifying limits on punitive damages awards. The purely economic damages
awarded here arise exclusively from an arm's-length contractual bargain—listening to
sales presentations in exchange for a $500 certificate and other gifts—where fraud is
alleged to have induced the claimants to enter into a contract. Yet the claimants here
affirm that contract and seek damages stemming from Westgate's independent
contractor's making it difficult to obtain a part of the benefit of their bargain. The bulk of
the actual damages awarded by the jury—$7,000—are contractual damages. The
damages resulting from fraud amount to $242. Yet whether comparing punitive damages
with all actual damages or only fraud damages, the punitive damages awards are grossly
disproportional under the measuring sticks structured by the United States Supreme Court
and the Utah Supreme Court.
II.

Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts
After nearly a decade of litigation, it is easy to overlook the initial reason that 500

diverse consumer claims were joined and 15 of those claims then consolidated for trial. It
was not because the consumers knew each other, let alone were motivated to come
together to file a class action lawsuit. And it is not because multiple consumers brought
individual claims that caused someone to suggest consolidation. Instead, the claims at
issue here were filed together, and then consolidated, only because a former Westgate

contractor, Shaun Adel, stole Westgate documents, formed CPG, and solicited claim
assignments with the promise that the consumers would share in any recovery at no cost
to them. (R. 7-9, 2755g-i.) CPG, which itself had no claim against Westgate, then filed
all the claims in its own name. (R. 117-36.)
The 500 claims were based on theories that Westgate breached a contract with the
consumer or fraudulently induced the consumer to enter into a contract. The contract
involved consumers who could afford to purchase a timeshare property listening to a
sales presentation in exchange for a certificate worth $500 to travel to Anaheim (the
Anaheim Certificate).2 (Trial Tr. 489, 686, 857, 2381.) The alleged contract breach was
that the certificate was difficult to redeem, thus depriving the consumer of the benefit of
the bargain. (Trial Tr. 2381.) The alleged fraudulent conduct was that Westgate was
reckless in representing the value of the certificate, which, because it was difficult to
redeem, was not worth $500. (Trial Tr. 2394-95.)
Seven years later, 15 consumer claims were tried together in a single trial.
(R. 4710-12, 4723-51.) At that trial, CPG's recovery of actual damages for each claim
varied from $5 to $550 and totaled $7,242. (R. 4772-802.) Importantly, these
compensatory damages were purely economic, as the jury refused to award any damages
for emotional distress. (Id.)
The jury also awarded punitive damages. (R. 4758-72.) For a claim involving a
consumer who redeemed the certificate, traveled to Anaheim, and took his family to
Disneyland, the jury awarded CPG $66,666.67 in punitive damages. (Id.) For the claims
2

In addition to the Anaheim Certificate, the consumers also all received other gifts such
as gift certificates for shopping and dining and free passes for area golf courses and ski
slopes. These other gifts were not at issue at trial.

involving consumers who rejected the Anaheim Certificate when offered it but accepted
other valuable gifts they used, the jury awarded CPG $66,666.67 in punitive damages.
(Id.) For the claims involving consumers who accepted the Anaheim Certificate but
never attempted to redeem it, the jury awarded CPG $66,666.67 in punitive damages.
(Id.) And for the claims involving consumers who tried to redeem the certificate but
were unable to do so, the jury awarded CPG $66,666.67 in punitive damages. (Id.)
These awards are, on average, 138 times larger than the average economic damages in
this case. On a claim-by-claim basis, the awards range from 121 times to 13,333 times
the size of the economic damages awards and from 1,333 times to 13,333 times the size
of the economic damages resulting from fraud.
On their face, the uniformity of the punitive damages awards are explained by the
fact that disparate claims were consolidated so the jury heard the worst facts and,
essentially ignoring the evidence specific to each claimant, considered only those worst
facts when arriving at a punitive damages award for each claim. But two additional
factors also explain the uniform awards. First, during trial and during CPG's closing
arguments, the jury was told about numerous nonparties who allegedly had been harmed
by Westgate's conduct. (Trial Tr. 506, 560, 762.) Second, during closing arguments in
the punitive damages phase of the trial, counsel for CPG invited the jury to fulfill "the
primary purpose of punitive damage [which] is to make sure that on a one time basis we
can address this as a whole." (Trial Tr. 2646-47.) In the end, the sum total of these
punitive damages for 15 claims was $1,000,000.05. Extrapolated to the other 485 claims,
Westgate's total punishment would be more than $33 million.

A.

The Consolidation of Nearly 500 Consumer Claims into a Single
Lawsuit and the Test Trial of 15 Claims

From the outset, Westgate objected to the joinder of claims, especially if they were
to be consolidated for trial. (R. 2760r-t.) The trial court allowed the claims to be joined.
(R. 2768f-j.) Once the claims were joined, CPG proposed a "test trial," in which it would
choose 30 claims to "be handled on a fast track discovery schedule and a separate trial."
(R. 2776-80.) Under CPG's plan, the 30 claims would not be the claims most factually
similar, but would be representative of all the different types of claims. (R. 2778.) CPG
suggested that results of the "test trial" could be used as "law of the case . . . res judicata
. . . or a strong persuasive precedent to apply to the remaining claims." (Id.) CPG also
represented that the outcome of this test trial could guide settlement negotiations. (Id.)
Westgate opposed CPG's "test trial" plan. Westgate argued that each instance of
alleged fraud was distinct and consolidation of multiple fraud claims would be improper.
(R. 2798-803.) Westgate pointed out that "[j]uries are often unable to distinguish the
defendants' liability as to each claim," especially where, as here, the jury would hear
evidence related to nonparties that would otherwise be inadmissible in a single claim
trial. (R. 2799, 2801-03.) The trial court ordered discovery on all claims and reserved its
ruling on consolidation until trial. (R. 2862.)
Ultimately, the trial court adopted what was, in effect, a version of CPG's
proposed plan. Ten days before trial, the court ordered the parties to proceed to trial on
16 claims.3 (R. 4680, 4714-18.) Around this same time, the court compelled the parties
to submit all of the consumer claims involving other claimants under the Utah Pattern of
Unlawful Activity Act to arbitration. (R. 4714-15.) The 16 claims went to trial.
3

Westgate obtained judgment as a matter of law on the claim of one consumer, leaving
15 claims that went to the jury. (R. 4933-34.)

B.

Westgate Is Prejudiced at Trial

At trial, the prejudice Westgate had predicted would result from consolidating
diverse fraud claims in fact occurred. In addition to the jury's deciding each case after
hearing about the 14 other consolidated claims, at least three times CPG's witnesses told
the jury that Westgate had defrauded hundreds or thousands of people. One witness
stated that there were "hundreds or a thousand plus people" involved in the "whole
situation." (Trial Tr. 762.) Another witness stated that if Westgate had fulfilled its
promises "there wouldn't be 1,000 of us consumers . . . or 10,000 of us that had been
misled." (Trial Tr. 508.) Yet another witness referred to the fact that her recovery in this
case would be impacted by the fact that there were "900 people" who had similarly
assigned their claims to CPG. (Trial Tr. 560.)
During closing arguments in the punitive damages phase, counsel for CPG
aggravated the problem by arguing that the purpose of punitive damages required that the
jury punish Westgate for wrongful conduct directed to third parties:
Now, this is a perfect example of why punitive damages have to
be large. It's taken us three weeks to try 15 couples out of
hundreds and hundreds and hundreds out of the 2400 to 3700
tours that had this gift certificate.
Can you see the purpose and wisdom of having punitive damages
awarded? Because it is in our legal system nearly impossible to
try and litigate the entire matter or we'd be here for years, and so
that is the primary purpose of punitive damage is to make sure
that on a one time basis we can address this as a whole.
(Trial Tr, 2646-47 (emphasis added).) When the witnesses made comments about
nonparties, the court struck the comments. (R. 508, 560, 762.) But when counsel for
CPG resurrected the prejudice from those stricken comments during his closing

arguments in the punitive damages phase, the court refused to strike the comments.
(Trial Tr. 2647-48.) As a ground for its refusal, the trial court read the jury instruction
that permitted punitive damages to be awarded in light of "the effect of the conduct on
the lives of consumers and others." (Trial Tr. 2648.) The court did not elaborate on how
the jury should interpret that instruction in light of CPG's arguments urging punishment
for conduct directed at third parties. (Trial Tr. 2649.)
As predicted by Westgate before trial, because the consumers each testified as to
their own interactions with Westgate, the jury heard evidence about other alleged conduct
it would not have heard had the cases been tried alone. For instance, Darren and Irene
Davis were consumers who successfully redeemed their certificate and took their family
to Disneyland. (Trial Tr. 753-55.) But by the time the jury was asked to determine
Westgate's liability to these consumers—and to punish Westgate—the jury had heard
about 14 other consumers who did not travel. One consumer was offered an Anaheim
Certificate, but rejected it. (Trial Tr. 672-73.) Others accepted their certificates, but
never attempted to redeem them. (Trial Tr. 524, 527, 865-66, 918, 1383, 1389-92.) The
remaining consumers attempted to redeem their certificates but were unsuccessful. (Trial
Tr. 131-36, 202, 255, 326-27, 393, 453-54, 606, 795, 823, 826-27.)
Not only did the claimants have different levels of success in using the certificates,
but they also testified about having different expectations and different levels of reliance.
One consumer testified that, prior to his transaction with Westgate, he had attended a
similar presentation with a different timeshare company and that the trip he was promised
as a reward for that transaction never materialized. (Trial Tr. 249.) He testified that he
thought the Westgate offer sounded "[t]oo good to be true," but that he was willing to

in

"give it a try again." (Trial Tr. 249, 278.) When asked whether he would have attended
the presentation if he "had known there were extensive restrictions" associated with the
Anaheim Certificate, he responded "I'm a gambler, I probably would have." (Trial
Tr. 249.) Other consumers testified that, even after they encountered difficulty
redeeming the certificate, they attended subsequent Westgate presentations in the hope of
obtaining more free gifts. (Trial Tr. 495-96, 628, 690.) Some of the consumers testified
that they had no intention of buying a Westgate package, but attended the presentation
because they wanted a free trip. (Trial Tr. 248, 397, 804, 930.) Some testified about
knowing the Anaheim Certificate would include travel restrictions. (Trial Tr. 401, 719,
801,930.) Others did not. (Trial Tr. 201, 249, 324, 392, 452, 670, 791, 863.) Most
testified that they had attended similar presentations. (Trial Tr. 145, 249, 396, 486, 618,
804, 836, 929, 1347.) Yet they all were awarded the same in punitive damages.
The court did not instruct the jury in a way adequate to counteract the merging of
all the testimony to consider all claims. The only instructions designed to ensure that
jurors would evaluate each claim independently were instructions that "Westgate is
entitled to a fair consideration of its defense against each consumer," that "[t]he assigned
claims of each of the 15 consumers must be considered separately" and that jurors should
"ignore the . . . fact that CPG has, or has not, established the claims of any of the other 14
consumers." (Trial Tr. 13,2380.) These instructions were insufficient to mitigate the
prejudice; indeed, no instruction could have accomplished that. As mentioned, the jury
awarded almost identical compensatory damages to each consumer, notwithstanding the
fact that some consumers never attempted to redeem their certificate and other consumers
were offered their certificates but rejected them altogether. (R. 4773-802.) And in

awarding punitive damages, the jury did not make any distinctions—CPG received an
identical punitive damages award of $66,666.67 for each claim. (R. 4758-72.)
C.

The Trial Court Denies Westgate's Combined Motion for JNOV,
Remittitur, and New Trial

After trial, Westgate moved for JNOV, remittitur of the punitive damages award,
and for a new trial. In support of its motion for JNOV, Westgate again raised arguments
concerning consolidation and pointed out that the result of trial demonstrates the
prejudice of consolidation. (R. 4897-901.) In support of its motion for a new trial,
Westgate asserted the excessiveness of the punitive damages awards. Westgate argued
that, given the conduct at issue, the punitive damages awards are excessive because they
range from 121 to 13,333 times larger than the total compensatory damages awards.
(R. 4865-76.) Westgate also argued that the jury had impermissibly awarded punitive
damages based on harms the jury believed were caused to third parties. (R. 4866.)
The trial court denied Westgate's JNOV and new trial motions on the ground that
Westgate was a successful corporation that had profited from its actions and had shown
no remorse during trial. (R. 5804.) Although the court acknowledged that the highest
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages generally permitted under federal due process
case law is 9 to 1, and under state standards is 3 to 1, it denied the request for remittitur
because the punitive awards "would hardly be a drop in the bucket" for Westgate.
(R. 5802-03.) The court also noted that, in agreeing to hear a sales presentation in
exchange for a certificate, the consumers had "placed a degree of trust in Westgate,"
whose conduct was likely to recur because the fraud was difficult to detect. (R. 5802.)

The trial court's analysis of the excessiveness of the punitive awards is silent
about the fact that many claimants conceded they were chosen specifically because they
were not financially vulnerable, a relevant mitigating factor. (Trial Tr. 489, 686, 857.)
The trial court's decision also is silent about the fact that many certificate recipients were
well educated and employed in highly sophisticated fields. The consumers' professions
included, among other things, a tax examiner and senior investigative analyst for the
I.R.S., a teacher, a paramedic, a computer consultant, a hospital health unit coordinator, a
sales manager, an electrical engineer, a retired mechanical engineer, an advertising
consultant, and a professor at B.Y.U. (Trial Tr. 88, 172, 246, 314-15, 512-13, 595, 728,
853, 901, 947, 1344.) Many of the consumers had at least one, if not several,
undergraduate or graduate degrees. (Trial Tr. 88, 172, 246, 443, 512-13, 595-96, 1344.)
The court also did not address Westgate's argument that, because the jury
improperly punished Westgate for conduct directed at third parties, the punitive damages
awards denied Westgate procedural due process. Instead, the court followed the theme of
CPG's counsel at closing argument, and ignored the actual testimony of the consumers
who anticipated the certificates might be difficult to redeem but attended sales
presentations because they wanted the free gift: "because it appears that Westgate
perpetrated the scheme on many unsuspecting victims," the effects of Westgate's conduct
did not weigh in its favor. (R. 5802.) Finally, the court did not address Westgate's
argument that, because the evidence at trial showed that the Anaheim Certificates were
purchased from and administered by an independent contractor, Westgate's conduct did
not justify a heightened punitive damages award. (Id.; R. 4868, 4910.)
Westgate timely appealed (R. 6097), and CPG cross-appealed. (R. 6108.)

Summary of the Argument
This case began with 500 consumers attending sales presentations for Westgate
timeshare packages. The consumers were selected because they had the financial means
to purchase Westgate products. In exchange for their time, Westgate offered the
consumers a gift certificate, valued at approximately $500, for travel to Anaheim,
California. The certificates, as many consumers later testified they had expected, were
difficult for some consumers to redeem.
This case ended with a jury awarding CPG—assignee of the 500 claims—more
than $1 million in punitive damages for just 15 of the 500 claims based upon the
difficulty in redeeming the certificates, an amount representing more than $33 million in
punitive damages when extrapolated over all 500 claims. Three errors explain the very
large awards. Those errors range from consolidating for trial 15 claims with disparate
fact patterns, to allowing counsel for CPG to ask the jury to punish Westgate for harm to
third parties, to refusing to remit punitive damages awards between 121 and 13,333 times
larger than the full compensatory awards and between 1,333 and 13,333 times larger than
the awards resulting from fraud rather than breach of contract.
In support of its request to reverse the trial court's verdict, Westgate focuses on
two overarching errors. The first fundamental trial court error was consolidating 15
disparate claims for trial instead of holding separate trials or at least consolidating claims
with similar fact patterns. Under Rule 42, trial courts have discretion to consolidate
claims, but must do so in a manner that mitigates, not exacerbates, prejudice. Here, CPG
proposed a "test trial" with disparate claims to evaluate the worth of all 500 claims. The
trial court consolidated 15 disparate claims, ranging from consumers who redeemed
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certificates and traveled, to consumers who did not try to redeem certificates, to
consumers who tried unsuccessfully to redeem certificates.
The manner of consolidation resulted in prejudice, not only because in considering
each claim the jury heard evidence about 14 other claims, but also because the trial court
allowed counsel for CPG to urge the jury to punish Westgate for conduct directed at third
parties who were not before the court. The resulting prejudice is apparent. The jury
awarded identical punitive damages on all 15 claims—$66,666.67—even though one
consumer redeemed a certificate and incurred only $5 in damages; another consumer
testified that he never intended to purchase a Westgate product when he attended the
sales presentation; and another consumer testified he would have attended the sale
presentation even if he had known the certificate was difficult to redeem. The jury's
failure to discriminate among such fact patterns confirms that the manner of
consolidation resulted in prejudice to Westgate.
The second fundamental trial court error was its refusal either to vacate or to remit
the punitive damages awards on the ground that they violate federal procedural due
process, federal substantive due process, and Utah law. Addressing the procedural due
process point, a court must implement procedures that will prevent a jury from punishing
the defendant for harms to third parties. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346,
356-57 (2007). Here, over Westgate's objection, counsel for CPG told the jury that "the
primary purpose of punitive damage is to make sure that on a one time basis we can
address this as a whole/' and the whole, according to CPG's counsel, was "hundreds and
hundreds and hundreds out of the 2400 to 3700 tours that had this gift certificate." (Trial
Tr. 2646-47(emphasis added).) With $1 million in punitive damages awards, the jury did

just what counsel asked it to do: it punished Westgate for conduct directed at third
parties, something that violated Westgate's right to procedural due process.
In the alternative, the excessiveness of the punitive damages awards violates
Westgate's substantive due process rights. That the punishment is grossly excessive
under principles of substantive due process is made clear by considering the total
punishment to Westgate, which, assuming the jury was not punishing Westgate for more
than the 15 claims before it, would be the $66,666.67 per claim extrapolated to all 500
claims. Under that scenario, Westgate would be punished by paying more than
$33 million for its independent contractor having administered a certificate redemption
program involving only the one certificate—the Anaheim Certificate at issue here—that
some found difficult to redeem. Those awards are excessive as a matter of federal
substantive due process and Utah law when analyzed under the operative standards. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (State Farm II), 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003);
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange (Crookston I), 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991).
The constitutional presumption under the federal due process clause is that
punitive damages will not exceed a 1 to 1 ratio with compensatory damages. The
presumption under Utah law in cases like this one is a 2 to 1 ratio. There is no egregious
conduct to justify departing from those presumptions. The compensatory awards made
consumers whole, the damages were purely economic, the consumers were not
financially vulnerable, the consumers' safety and welfare were not threatened, and
comparable civil penalties would result in only a 2 to 1 ratio of penalty to compensation.
Assuming the punitive awards do not violate procedural due process in reflecting
punishment for conduct directed at third parties, this court should remit the punitive
awards under the standards of federal due process and Utah law.
1A

Argument
This court should reverse on two separate grounds. First, the trial court abused its
discretion in consolidating 15 disparate claims for trial, and not more carefully guarding
against the prejudice inherent in consolidating disparate claims. Second, the punitive
damages awards violate principles of procedural and substantive due process, as well as
Utah law defining the outer limit of punitive damages awards. For the prejudice resulting
from consolidation and the procedural due process violation, this court should vacate the
verdict and order a new trial. Alternatively, to bring the punitive awards in compliance
with substantive due process and Utah law, the court should remit the awards.
I.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Consolidating 15 Disparate
Consumer Claims for Trial Without Mitigating the Resulting Prejudice
The trial court's manner of consolidating 15 claims in a single trial and in

conducting the trial resulted in prejudice to Westgate and requires a new trial. When
cases present "a common question of law or fact," Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides trial courts discretion in deciding whether to consolidate issues for
trial. Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 806 (Utah 1979). But a trial court exceeds that
discretion if its manner of consolidation "is unfair or prejudicial to a party.'" Walker
Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998) (quoting Angelo v.
Armstrong World Indus.. 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993)).
Here, 15 consumer claims were consolidated for trial. The stated purpose of
consolidation was to "enhance the likelihood of settlement and resolution o f the
remaining 485 claims. (R. 2780.) To facilitate this, over Westgate's objections, CPG
was allowed to try claims with disparate underlying facts so that "each area [could] be

appropriately adjudicated on a small scale" and to give rise either to "law of the case, res
judicata . . . or a strong persuasive precedent to apply to the remaining claims." (R. 2778.)
That bellwether approach to trying cases is, in important respects, the opposite of
the justification for permitting a number of claims to be tried together, either as a class
action or through consolidation. The purpose behind the Rule 23 requirements for
certifying a class—impossibility of joinder, commonality, typicality, and representative
parties that will protect the interests of all class members—is to ensure due process when
a court adjudicates the rights of nonparties in collective litigation. 7A Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & May Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1751 (3d
ed. 2005). And while consolidation can be used to construct a "test trial," in doing so, a
court is still bound by Rule 42's requirement that the cases share "a common question of
law or fact," an echo of the requirements for a class action under Rule 23.
Accordingly, plaintiffs who forego a class action in complex litigation may seek
consolidation both for purposes of convenience and, as was the case here, to influence
settlement negotiations. In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 995,
998 (9th Cir. 2008). In such a "test trial," the plaintiffs (or in this case, the assignee)
typically seek to consolidate the broadest variety of claims possible—without respect for
class-action-type commonality—so that the result of the trial can assist the plaintiffs in
estimating the differing price points of the variety of claims they have collected. Id.; In
re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109F.3d 1016, 1018-20 (5th Cir. 1997).
While courts have not held "test trial" practice to be per se impermissible, it gives
rise to unique concerns under Rule 42. The threshold requirement for consolidation, "a
common question of law or fact," is insufficient to mitigate potential prejudice in a
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bellwether case. Utah R. Civ. P. 42 (emphasis added). Courts must balance the "specific
risks of prejudice and possible [jury] confusion" against the economic incentives that
may flow from trying claims together. Malcolm v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350
(2d Cir. 1993); see also In re Consol. Parlodel Litig., 182 F.R.D. 441, 444 (D.NJ. 1998)
(indicating that steps to mitigate potential prejudice are required in fourth, second, and
eleventh circuits).4 But a fair trial remains the overarching objective: "[considerations
of convenience and economy must yield to a paramount concern for a fair and impartial
trial," particularly where, as here, the "test trial" would not be dispositive of either
Westgate's liability to the remaining claimants or those other claimants' damages should
further trials be conducted. Malcolm, 995 F.2d at 350.
In cases upholding consolidation under such circumstances, appellate courts have
focused on the steps the trial court took to "make sure that the rights of the parties are not
prejudiced by the order of consolidation." Dupont v. S. Pac. Co., 366 F.2d 193, 196 (5th
Cir. 1966). Where trial courts have taken "considerable care during the trial to minimize
[juror] confusion," Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir.
1985), consolidation is upheld as within the bounds of discretion. Those cases give some
idea of what steps are necessary to protect against unfair prejudice. For instance, in
Hendrix, the trial court attempted to "ensure that each claim would receive separate
consideration" by giving each juror "a notebook, tabbed for each plaintiff and each
defendant, and during the presentation of evidence the jurors would be given time, as
necessary, to make notes." 776 F.2d at 1496. In stark contrast to the special care taken
4

Westgate has been unable to locate any Utah cases examining Rule 42 in the context of
bellwether cases. But because Federal Rule 42 is similar, this court may consider federal
courts' interpretation of Federal Rule 42. Bichler v. DEI Svs., Inc., 2009 UT 63, f 24
n.2, 220 P.3d 1203.

in Hendrix, the trial court here made no provision to facilitate the mandated separate
consideration of each of the claims, instead instructing jurors that they could take notes
but cautioned them not to "overdo it and [not to] let your note taking distract you from
following the evidence." (Trial Tr. 12.)
Together, the relevant federal cases establish not only that consolidation is
inappropriate where the risks of prejudice outweigh potential benefits, but also that
consolidation must be handled with caution to minimize the chances of unfair prejudice.
The decision to consolidate carries with it "a heightened need to insist on scrupulous
fairness in all other aspects of the trial of the consolidated cases." Arnold v. Eastern Air
Lines, 712 F.2d 889, 907 (4th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Murnaghan, J., concurring).
Here, while some sets of the 500 claims might have been brought together and
consolidated without undue prejudice to Westgate, the disparity of the 15 claims chosen
for consolidation for trial makes them not one of those sets. Rather, their diversity
heightened the prejudice. Because the claims were disparate and the trial court did not
insist on steps being taken to ensure "scrupulous fairness" and to minimize prejudice, the
jury was permitted to hear inadmissible evidence and to punish Westgate for harms
suffered by third parties and nonparties. Westgate's conduct toward each consumer was
relevant at trial only to the claims of that consumer. Yet the jury heard evidence in
deciding each individual claim that, in separate trials, would have been inadmissible
character propensity evidence under Rule 404(b)—it tended only to show that Westgate's
actions toward any particular consumer were in conformity with Westgate's general
character. In separate trials, Rule 403 would have prevented introduction of that
evidence. Because the claims were so disparate, the resulting prejudice to Westgate was

aggravated. Jurors heard evidence concerning other claimants whose stories are far less
sympathetic and were heavily influenced by the most sympathetic of the claimants. This
elevated level of prejudice stems from the improper consolidation.
The manner in which the trial court allowed CPG's counsel to present the
consolidated cases heightened the prejudice and indeed led to violations of Westgate's
procedural due process rights. In addition to hearing about the other 14 claims, the jury
heard from different witnesses who referred to the "900 people," "1000 people," or the
"1000:10,000 misled" allegedly harmed by Westgate's conduct. In each of these
instances, the court sustained Westgate's objection and struck the testimony. But during
CPG's closing argument in the punitive damages phase—when the need for "scrupulous
fairness" is at its height—those stricken comments were given renewed prejudicial
vitality when CPG's counsel argued to the jury: "if [you] say, well, we're just going to
punish Westgate for these 15 people, then [you] are not doing the purpose and fulfilling
the purpose of punitive damages awards." (R. 2642.) Counsel for CPG continued,
because it had taken "three weeks to try 15 couples out of hundreds and hundreds and
hundreds out of the 2400 to 3700 . . . that had this gift certificate," and because it would
be "nearly impossible to try and litigate the entire matter," it was incumbent upon the jury
to "make sure that on a one time basis [it] addressed] this as a whole," even though
CPG's counsel knew that those 15 verdicts would have no issue preclusive effect upon
Westgate's liability to other claimants and that punitive damages could be requested if
and when any of those claims proceeded to trial. (R. 2646-47 (emphasis added).)
Westgate objected and moved to strike counsel's statements, but the trial court
refused. When Westgate then asked the court to clarify whether CPG could "argue that

punitive damages can be awarded for the entire group of people that might have been
affected" by Westgate's use of the Anaheim Certificate, the court responded simply by
reading a jury instruction stating that the jury could consider "the effect of the conduct on
the lives of the consumers and others." (R. 2648-49.)
The court's refusal to strike counsel's statements not only compounded the error in
consolidating 15 disparate claims, but, coupled with the manner of consolidation—trying
together disparate claims—also denied Westgate its procedural due process rights. As
the United States Supreme Court held in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, courts must
safeguard against "the unreasonable and unnecessary risk" that a jury will punish the
defendant for having caused harm to others. 549 U.S. 346, 357 (2007). Here, that
unnecessary risk arose because (i) the jury was exposed to disparate claims and
inadmissible evidence concerning other consumers; and (ii) after CPG's counsel was
permitted to invite the jury to punish Westgate for harm to nonparties, the trial court's
instruction—that CPG could invite the jury to consider "the effect of the conduct on the
lives of the consumers and others"—was inadequate.
In State Farm v. Campbell the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion
that through the language of that instruction—the jury could consider "the effect of the
conduct on the lives of the consumers and others"—a plaintiff can invite a jury to
"adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a defendant under the
guise of the reprehensibility analysis." State Farm II, 538 U.S. at 423 (citing Campbell v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (State Farm I), 2001 UT 89,139, 65 P.3d 1134). Thus,
the trial court did not act to mitigate the unreasonable risk of prejudice arising from
consolidation and CPG's closing argument. Instead, the trial court heightened that risk.

The punitive damages awards confirm that the unnecessary risk of prejudice
translated into to actual prejudice. The jury did not meaningfully distinguish between the
consumer who redeemed the Anaheim Certificate and took his family on a vacation, the
consumers who were offered the certificate but refused to take it, the consumers who
accepted the certificate but were unable to arrange travel dates, and the consumers who
received the certificate and did nothing at all. Rather than undertaking an individualized
determination of the nature of the harm in each case, the jury imposed a collective award
of $1,000,000 and then divvied it up 15 ways—$66,666.67 per claim. This court should
vacate the verdicts and remand for new trials.
II.

The Punitive Damages Awards Violate Both the United States Constitution
and Utah Law
The punitive damages awards violate federal procedural and substantive due

process and Utah law. Punitive damages are unique. They impose a quasi-criminal
penalty in a civil proceeding. State Farm II, 538 U.S. at 417-18. They "'pose an acute
danger of arbitrary deprivation of property.'" Id (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg;,
512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994)). And they invite a jury to act on its passion and exercise its
caprice. Id. at 418; see also Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 801.
A number of substantive safeguards ensure that defendants are not punished
arbitrarily. For example, federal substantive due process protections require courts to
review a jury's punitive damages award de novo to ensure it is not disproportional to the
gravity of the offense. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S.
424, 434-36 (2001). Similarly, under Utah law awards are reviewed to ensure they are
not the result of passion or prejudice. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc, 2003 UT 41, ff 29-

31, 82 P.3d 1064. Further, procedural due process requires courts to take steps to ensure
that juries do not punish a defendant for conduct directed at third parties. Philip Morris
USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355-57 (2007). The punitive damages awards here run
afoul of both substantive and procedural protections. Although there is substantial
overlap between federal and state law, Westgate will address each separately.
A.

The Punishment Imposed on Westgate Is Excessive Under the United
States Constitution

The punishments in this case exceed all actual damages by an average of 138
times and exceed damages resulting from fraud by an average of more than 4100 times.
Extrapolated to all 500 claims, the total punitive damages awards would be more than
$33 million. Those awards violate federal substantive due process standards.
1.

The Nature of the Punitive Damages Awards

Before setting forth the relevant legal standards, it is important to be clear about
the precise nature of the damages awards in this case. The jury awarded CPG $1,000,000
in total punitive damages, which is 138 times greater than the $7,242 in total economic
compensatory damages and more than 4100 times greater than the $242 in damages the
jury attributed to fraud. For 14 of the 15 claims, $500 of the jury's award to CPG (a total
of $7,000 of the overall $7,242 in compensatory damages) was for contract damages.5
Therefore, the relevant denominator for fixing the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages ranges from $0 to $5 to $50 and totals $242 for all 15 claims.
5

The court distinguished contract and fraud damages in the special verdict form when it
awarded pre-judgment interest under Utah Code section 15-1-1(2) only as to "each $500
award." (R. 4818.) Under section 15-1-1, pre-judgment interest is appropriate only for
damages resulting from breach of contract, not from tort. Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2)
(setting pre-judgment interest at 10% for claims where the contract does not specify a
different rate). Thus, $500 of each of the 15 claims represents only contract damages.

Thus, Westgate's punitive damages liability of $1 million is 4132 times the damages
related to fraud—the only cause of action that can be a basis for punitive damages.
For additional context, recall that CPG's purpose of consolidating the 15 claims
was to help determine the value of the remaining 485 claims. Thus, the punitive damages
awards here represent only 3% (15 out of 500) of the total value of the assigned claims.6
Extrapolating these results to all the claims yields the following: $241,400 in economic
damages, $8,066.67 in economic damages resulting from fraud, and $33,333,333 in
punitive damages, for a total of $33,574,733, all for 500 certificates provided by an
independent contractor that were difficult to redeem.
With that context in mind, the ratios of the punitive damages awards to
compensatory awards, the nature of Westgate's conduct, and the relevant legislative
determinations of appropriate penalties all demonstrate that the punitive damages awards
here are constitutionally excessive.
2.

The Punishment Imposed on Westgate Is Grossly
Disproportional to the Gravity of the Harm

The punitive damages awarded to CPG exceed the proportions permitted under
federal due process standards. A punitive damages award is unconstitutional if it is
"grossly disproportional to the gravity of [the offense]." Cooper, 532 U.S. at 434.
Proportionality is evaluated under three factors: (i) the reprehensibility of the punishable
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Westgate concedes the effectiveness of this extrapolation for purposes of argument
only. In this case, the consumer claims were not tried in such a way that Westgate can be
bound by these awards as to claims not tried in these proceedings. Indeed, this is
precisely what makes this award so misjudged—the jurors were asked to punish Westgate
on behalf of all of the consumers who might have participated in this program but whose
claims have not yet gone to trial. Yet Westgate cannot now preclude subsequent punitive
damages awards on the theory that it has already been punished.

conduct, (ii) the disparity between the harm caused by this conduct and the size of the
punitive damages award, and (iii) the relationship between a judicially sanctioned
punitive award and any legislatively established punishments authorized for similar
conduct. BMW ofN. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
Although the relationship between those three factors has been left somewhat
vague, the purpose of requiring de novo appellate review of punitive damages awards is
to "ensure[] that an award of punitive damages is based upon an application of law rather
than a decisionmaker's caprice." State Farm IL 538 U.S. at 418 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, courts must guard against the "acute danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property" and the "potential that juries will use their verdicts to express
biases against big businesses." Id. at 417 (quoting Honda Motor Co., 512 U.S. at 432).
In awarding punitive damages that bear almost no relationship to the consequences of
Westgate's tortious conduct, the jury here exceeded the boundaries of constitutionally
permissible punishment.
We now address the Gore guideposts.
a.

The Ratio of Punitive Damages to Compensatory
Damages

Despite being the second guidepost, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages provides the initial touchstone for assessing punitive damages. Gore, 517 U.S.
at 581-82. The presumptive ratio is 1 to 1, but a departure from that ratio may be
appropriate where "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of
economic damages" or, possibly, where "the injury is hard to detect or the monetary
value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine." IdL at 582 (internal

quotations omitted). Even with egregious conduct, however, "few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio . . . will satisfy due process." State Farm II, 538 U.S. at 425.
The trial court here incorrectly concluded that this case presented the combustible
combination of egregious acts and minimal harm that would justify imposing punitive
damages awards with ratios to actual damages far exceeding single digit ratios. More
important, the trial court ignored the class-type relief being pursued by CPG, which, in
the aggregate, would amount to more than $33 million in punitive damages alone.
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 & n.28 (2008), a maritime
case, the Supreme Court explained why courts may impose larger punitive damages
awards when compensatory damages are small: "The criterion of 'substantial' takes into
account the role of punitive damages to induce legal action when pure compensation may
not be enough to encourage suit, [but that] concern [is] addressed by the opportunity for a
class action

" Further, in fixing the relevant ratio in a class-action, "individual

awards are not the touchstone, for it is the class option that facilitates suit." Id. (emphasis
added). When class recovery is substantial, it is immaterial that individual awards may
have been small, and "the constitutional outer limit may well be 1:1." Id. Although CPG
did not to file this suit as a class action, the assignment of claims to CPG for purpose of
prosecution—not the potential for punitive damages—is the "option that facilitates suit."
Id. That operates exactly the same in that respect as a certified class action.
Accordingly, while departure from the single-digit-ratio analysis might be justified
in cases where punitive damages provide the incentive to challenge wrongful conduct, it
does not where that purpose has already been served. CPG, as assignee of the 15
claimants, has recovered $7,242. And CPG, as assignee of 485 more claims, does not

lack incentive to seek another $241,400. That is precisely the sort of "substantial"
recovery that justifies the presumptive 1 to 1 ratio. Moreover, the trial court ignored the
other 485 claims when concluding that a 1 to 1 ratio was inappropriate because a $75242
punishment would not send the necessary message to Westgate, even though the trial
court also recognized that this trial would not be dispositive of the remaining claims.
What perhaps explains the trial court's mistake is its apparent reliance upon
several cases cited by CPG in opposition to Westgate's motion for remittitur that are
inapposite because they involve awards of solely nominal or presumed damages.7 In
those cases, the remedy represents precisely the combination of factors that requires
departure from a small ratio punitive damages award: plaintiffs suffer harm in a manner
that justifies punishment, but plaintiffs have no measurable economic harm. For
example, in Williams v. Kaufman County, the Fifth Circuit aptly pointed out, "[b]ecause
actions seeking vindication of constitutional rights are more likely to result only in
nominal damages, strict proportionality would defeat the ability to award punitive
damages at all.5' 352 F.3d 994, 1016 (5th Cir. 2003). Put differently, punitive damages
may be disproportionally large in cases involving only nominal damage because the true
amount of harm cannot be adequately assessed. Restatement (Second) Torts § 907 cmt. c
(2010). But here the jury was not considering civil rights claims invoking constitutional
guarantees but rather contract claims arising from an advertising campaign for which the
7

Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1016 (5th Cir. 2003); Biornson v. Dave
Smith Motors, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1283 (D. Idaho 2008); Hadelman v. DeLuca, No.
CV970060279S, 2003 WL 21493968, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 12, 2003); Ellis v. La
Vecchia, 567 F. Supp. 2d 601, 610-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Diversified Water Diversion,
Inc. v. Standard Water Control Sys., No. A07-1828, 2008 WL 4300258, at * 7 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 16, 2008); Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 95 P.3d 977, 992 (Idaho 2004).
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precise value of economic damages for each consumer was easily determinable by the
jury. Unlike awards of nominal damages, these awards represent the full measure of the
harm caused by Westgate to each consumer. With the benefit of that information, a
proportional punishment could have been, and should have been, crafted.
Tellingly, in the trial court's written decision denying Westgate's motion for
remittitur, it relied on Bennett v. Reynolds, 242 S.W.3d 866, 904-05 (Tex. Ct. App.
2007). (R. 5803.) In that case, the Texas Court of Appeals approved of a punitive
damages award of $1.25 million where compensatory damages totaled approximately
$5,000. Id. at 876. Importantly, however, the Texas Supreme Court has reversed that
decision. Bennett v. Reynolds, 315 S.W.3d 867, 879-80 (Tex. 2010). The Texas
Supreme Court held that a 4 to 1 ratio represented the constitutional limit. Id. at 878-79.
The court noted that "[p]ushing exemplary damages to the absolute constitutional limit in
a case like this leaves no room for greater punishment in cases involving death, grievous
physical injury, financial ruin, or actions that endanger a large segment of the public."
Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted the importance of
allowing departures from established punitive damages ratios only in particularly
egregious circumstances: "If courts fail to diligently police the 'particularly egregious'
exception, they insulate from due-process review precisely those cases where judicial
review matters most: those involving unsympathetic defendants where juries are most
likely to grant arbitrary and excessive awards. Allowing a freewheeling reprehensibility
exception would subvert the constraining power of the ratio guidepost." Id.
Here, a disproportionally large award is not necessary to compensate for nominal
damages. And given the fact that CPG's "assignee-for-prosecution" status has made it

possible for the consumers to obtain class-type relief, this also is not a case where
punitive damages must be inflated to incentivize future lawsuits of lone consumers.
Thus, the facts of this case do not justify a departure from the presumptive ratio. Such
departures should be reserved for cases "involving death, grievous physical injury,
financial ruin, or actions that endanger a large segment of the public."
b.

Westgate's Conduct Was Not Reprehensible

The reprehensibility factor also does not justify large punitive damages awards.
Considerations for evaluating reprehensibility include whether (i) the harm was physical
or merely economic; (ii) the conduct evidenced a reckless disregard of health or safety;
(iii) the plaintiff was financially vulnerable; (iv) the conduct was repeated or isolated; and
(v) the harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery, or deceit. State Farm IL 538 U.S.
at 419. Importantly, the fact that one factor weighs in favor of the plaintiff "may not be
sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award" at all, let alone an award above a 1 to 1
ratio. Id Where a plaintiff has been made whole by compensatory damages, punitive
damages are appropriate only if the defendant's conduct "is so reprehensible as to
warrant the imposition of further sanctions," something that is not present here. Id
First, there is no dispute that the consumers were not physically harmed. Nor did
Westgate's conduct constitute any manner of indifference to the consumers9 health or
safety. In fact, concluding that the facts of this case warrant a 138 to 1 ratio devalues
cases in which such a ratio may seem justified, i.e., cases involving serious injury or
death. Westgate's conduct also did not give rise to a potential for any greater harm. The
full extent of economic damages—the benefit of the bargain—was established at the time
the consumers attended the sales presentations.

Second, the consumers here were not financially vulnerable. The consumers were
solicited by Westgate because they had the financial means to purchase a Westgate
timeshare package. Even more important, financial vulnerability has nothing to do with
the basis of the consumers' claims. Westgate did not defraud the consumers out of any
property. Here, the jury was not asked to award damages based upon the inconvenience
of attending the sales presentation, but the inconvenience in redeeming the certificates.
And those frustrated expectations were fully remedied by the compensatory awards.
Third, as to each consumer, Westgate's conduct should be construed to involve
isolated incidents in light of the fact that 500 individual claims are being prosecuted.
And even though Westgate's sales presentations to consumers involved various other
certificates, including other gifts which these claimants received and used, only the
Anaheim Certificate forms the basis of any claims.
Finally, Westgate acknowledges that while the jury's finding of fraud inherently
includes a finding that Westgate deceived the consumers, that element is present in all
fraud cases. It does not make this case extraordinary. The extent of Westgate's
misrepresentations must be viewed in the context of an entire transaction. In explaining
its decision to go above single-digit ratios, the trial court indicated that the consumers
"placed a degree of trust in Westgate which was clearly breached." (R. 5802.) That
conclusion has no basis, except to the extent all fraud involves a degree of trust.
Westgate had nothing resembling a fiduciary relationship with consumers. Indeed, given
the intentions of a number of the claimants, it might be too generous to characterize
Westgate's exchanges with them as "arm's-length" transactions. Several consumers
testified that they had no intent to purchase a Westgate timeshare, as they were willing to

attend a sales presentation just to get a free trip. To illustrate the real "trust relationship"
present here, it is worth noting that breaches of fiduciary duty are justifiably deemed
reprehensible while breaches of contract cannot form the basis of a punitive damages
award. Because the transactions here did not originate from a place of trust, any deceit
finding does not involve the kind of deceit that is "so reprehensible as to warrant the
imposition of... sanctions" larger than those necessary to remedy the actual harm.
Given these considerations, the reprehensibility factors do not support punitive
damages awards beyond a 1 to 1 ratio.
c.

Civil Penalties Imposed for Similar Conduct

The final guidepost for assessing the constitutional excessiveness of a punitive
damages award is the size of the award in comparison to relevant civil penalties that
could be imposed for the same conduct. In evaluating alternative sanctions, courts
"accord substantial deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions
for the conduct at issue." Gore, 517 U.S. at 559 (internal quotation marks omitted). This
deference is important because it represents the only place in the analysis to consider a
legislatively determined state interest in punishing certain conduct. Where the
appropriate ratio is in doubt, comparable civil penalties should govern.
In this case, the comparable civil penalties stand in stark contrast to the
punishment imposed on Westgate. The Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act provides for
both the State and affected consumers to pursue remedial action in cases similar to this
one. Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-17, 13-11-19(2001). Assuming Westgate's conduct
constituted a deceptive act under the UCSPA, each consumer would have been permitted
to recover as damages his or her "actual damages or $2,000, whichever is greater." Id.

§ 13-11-19(2). Further, the Division of Consumer Protection could "impose an
administrative fine of up to $1,000" for each transaction. Id. § 13-11-17(4). These
remedies reflect the legislative determination that the State's interest in punishing such
practices can be satisfied by a civil penalty of $1,000 per transaction in addition to actual
damages. The punishment imposed on Westgate in this case, $66,666.67 per transaction,
is more than 66 times larger than the legislatively authorized penalty.
The Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activities Act confirms that legislatively-authorized
penalty. Id. § 76-10-1605(1) (2001). Assuming Westgate's conduct constituted a pattern
of unlawful activity, each consumer could recover "twice the damages he sustained]."
Id. For the consumer claims prosecuted by CPG in this action, then, the legislativelyauthorized recovery under the UPUAA would have ranged from $10 to $1100.
Just as similar provisions in Gore failed to "provide [a defendant] with fair notice
that [a] violation of... its provisions might subject an offender to a multimillion dollar
penalty," nothing in Utah statutes provided notice of the possibility of a $1 million
penalty for 15 transactions. Gore, 517 U.S. at 584. The legislature has determined that,
in addition to actual damages, civil penalties of approximately $1,000 per transaction will
sufficiently advance the state's interest. In light of those determinations, the awards here
are grossly disproportional and therefore violate substantive due process standards.
Because CPG obtained relief in this case by pursuing a class-type recovery,
whether the punishment was substantial must be evaluated in the aggregate. Cast in the
proper light, it is apparent that CPG's recovery is neither nominal nor so minimal that the
trial court was justified in disregarding presumptive constitutional ratios, the lack of

reprehensibility, and comparable civil penalties. The trial court erred when it denied
Westgate's motion for remittitur and to reduce the punitive awards to a 1 to 1 ratio.
B.

The Procedures at Trial Created an Unreasonable Risk That Westgate
Would Be Punished for Harm to Nonparties

The punitive damages awards also violate Westgate's procedural due process
rights because they resulted from a trial admitting an unreasonable risk that the jury
would (and did) punish Westgate for harm to nonparties. Procedural due process "forbids
a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts
upon . . . those who are essentially strangers to the litigation." Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007). That prohibition arises from the need to afford a
defendant the opportunity "to present every available defense/' an opportunity denied
where one plaintiffs claim becomes a platform to punish for claims unrelated to that
plaintiff. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
More important, the prohibition ensures that a defendant is not punished for harm
allegedly caused to nonparties, something that "would add a near standardless dimension
to the punitive damages equation: How many such victims are there? How seriously
were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur? The trial will not likely
answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to speculate." Id
And this manner of jury speculation undermines other procedural protections. As the
Supreme Court noted, "the fundamental due process concerns to which [the] punitive
damages cases refer—risks of arbitrariness, uncertainty, and lack of notice—will be
magnified." Id.

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that its precedent gives rise to possible
juror confusion. Jurors may consider, for purposes of determining whether the
defendant's conduct was reprehensible, whether "the conduct that harmed the plaintiff
also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public." Id. at 355. But the jury may
not then use this information to punish the defendant for harm that it may allegedly have
caused to strangers. Id, That gives rise to the "practical problem" of how to assess
"whether a jury, in taking account of harm caused others under the rubric of
reprehensibility, also seeks to punish the defendant for having caused injury to others."
Id. at 357. The solution also is practical: "[although the States have some flexibility to
determine what kind of procedures they will implement, federal constitutional law
obligates them to provide some form of protection in appropriate cases." Id.
Given the manner of consolidation in this case, procedural protections were
necessary, especially after counsel for CPG invited the jury to punish Westgate for the
entire universe of potential plaintiffs so that "on a one time basis" Westgate would be
punished for all the harm it had allegedly caused by offering the Anaheim Certificate.
Otherwise, CPG argued, the purpose of punitive damages would not be fulfilled because
it would be "nearly impossible to try and litigate the entire matter." (Trial Tr. 2646.)
The trial court then instructed the jury that it could consider "the effect of
[Westgate's] conduct on the lives of the consumers and others," language from this
court's decision in Crookston L 817 P.2d at 808. In State Farm, the United States
Supreme Court said that very language provides inadequate guidance because it would
permit adjudication of "the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims against a
defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility analysis" and would permit a defendant

to be punished "for being an unsavory individual or business" instead of for the conduct
that harmed the plaintiff. State Farm IL 538 U.S. at 422-23 (analyzing this court's
application of this standard in State Farm 1, 2001 UT 89, f 39). Where the likelihood of
punishing third parties is present, it is constitutionally inadequate for a trial court to rely
on that language alone to ensure that the jury was "not asking the wrong question, i.e.,
seeking not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish for harm caused to
strangers." Phillip Morris, 549 U.S. at 355.
Likelihoods aside, the jury here, in fact, did punish Westgate for harm to
nonparties, as demonstrated by both the sheer size of the jury's award and the identical
awards for disparate claims. At the very least, the claim involving the consumer who
redeemed his certificate and took his family on vacation should not have received the
same punitive award as those who did not redeem their certificates. If the jury intended
for its punishment to apply only to the 15 claims, then the extrapolated punitive damages
award for all of the consumers' claims would be $33,333,333, a grossly excessive
amount. If the jury instead followed the instruction of CPG's counsel and punished
Westgate for more than the 15 claims, then the awards violate procedural due process.
Either way, the punitive damages awards should be vacated or remitted.
C.

The Punitive Damages Awards Violate Utah Law Because They Were a
Result of Passion or Prejudice

Westgate is entitled to remittitur of the punitive damages award under Utah law as
well. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5) when a judgment is excessive, the
trial court is vested with authority to grant a new trial or to direct the entry of a new
judgment. The Utah Supreme Court has enumerated 7 factors in determining whether a
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judgment "appear[s] to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice."
Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5) These factors are (i) the relationship between compensatory
damages and the amount of punitive damages awarded; (ii) the relative wealth of the
defendant; (iii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; (iv) the circumstances surrounding
the misconduct; (v) the effect of the conduct on the lives of the plaintiff and others;
(vi) the probability of future recurrence; and (vii) the relationship of the parties.
Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 808. Much of the analysis under Utah law is similar to the due
process analysis under the federal constitution. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT
41, f 31, 82 P.3d 1064. Accordingly, in analyzing each of the Crookston factors,
Westgate will identify only the additional considerations under Utah law that confirm the
excessiveness of the punitive damages awards.
1.

The Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages

The trial court incorrectly concluded that punitive damages awards well above
single-digit ratios are warranted in this case. The excessiveness inquiry under Utah law
looks to the ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages as a touchstone
for determining excessiveness. That ratio provides a "presumptive ceiling" above which
a punitive damages award may not go without justification. Diversified Holdings v.
Turner, 2002 UT 129, ^ 32, 63 P.3d 686.
While in extreme cases federal due process permits punitive damages awards as
large as nine times the size of compensatory damages, State Farm IL 538 U.S. at 425,
Utah law is especially skeptical of awards exceeding a ratio of 3 to 1. Fairfax Realty,
2003 UT 41, f 45. The presumptive ratio provides the starting point for analysis. Here,
the punishment exceeds economic damages by 138 times, on average. And if the

consequences of the fraud are separated from the contractual damages, the punishment is
more than 4000 times greater than the fraud-based damages. Further, for reasons
discussed above, the trial court incorrectly concluded that the presumptive ratio has no
application, drawing analogies from nominal damages cases. Because CPG pursued
class-type recovery, it is inappropriate to treat these claims like suits for nominal
damages, especially where the extrapolated punitive damages would be $33,333,333.
To illustrate the trial court's error, consider Diversified Holdings, in which the
defendant fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to enter into a real estate contract.
Diversified Holdings v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, ff 2-3. The plaintiffs were defrauded out
of $70,000. Id. f 9. The parties negotiated at arm's length and the consequences to the
plaintiffs—after they were made whole by the compensatory judgment—were limited.
Id. ff 16, 20. The court concluded that the greatest permissible punitive damages award,
given the state's interests in deterring what this court called "garden-variety" fraud,
would be two times the compensatory damages award. Id. f^f 18, 33. Tellingly, here the
relevant civil penalties, which would total $1,000, are consistent with a 2 to 1 ratio with
all compensatory damages, contract and fraud. Excepting the fact that Westgate's
conduct did not harm any consumer in an amount nearing $70,000, the similarities
between this case and Diversified Holdings require a similar remittitur here.
2.

Westgate's Wealth Relative to the Size of the Award

Westgate's financial status does not justify the disproportional punitive damages
award. In determining the amount of punitive damages, a jury may consider the
defendant's wealth. Id. f 15. But the Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that "the
presence of substantial corporate assets is not alone sufficient to require an award that

exceeds" ratios between 1 to 1 and 3 to 1. Id. Further, even when wealth is properly
considered, it must be considered with care because it "provides an open-ended basis for
inflating awards." State Farm IL 538 U.S. at 427-28. This court has cited with approval
the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that "a typical punitive damages award may be around
one percent of the defendant's net worth." Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT 41, f 33 (citing Cash
v.BeltmannN.Am.Co., 900 F.2d 109, 111 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990)).
In practice, the Utah Supreme Court has never used a defendant's wealth as
o

justification for departing from a permissible punitive damages ratio. Further, even
where corporate defendants have substantial assets, the court has rarely approached the
1% mark. In Crookston and State Farm, both of which involved corporate defendants
and both of which the court characterized as egregious cases, the awards affirmed by this
court were 0.5% and 0.26%. State Farm I, 2001 UT 89, f 26; Crookston IL 860 P.2d at
940-41. Further, after remand from the United States Supreme Court, the reduced
amount of the punitive damages award in State Farm represented 0.016% of State Farm's
corporate assets. State Farm III, 2004 UT 34, f 1. Westgate has located only one case
where the court affirmed a punitive damages award proportionally larger than the
extrapolated award in this case.9 In Fairfax Realty, the court upheld a punitive damages
award that constituted 15% of the defendant's net worth. 2003 UT 41, f^f 33-34. But the
8

Indeed, except for Campbell v. State Farm, Westgate has been unable to find a single
case where this court has upheld a punitive damages award based on a multiplier large
than a single digit. See State Farm III, 2004 UT 34, f 1 (9 to 1); Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT
41,fflf33, 48 (5.5 to 1); Diversified Holdings, 2002 UT 129, f 33 (2 to 1); Hall v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 109, 110 (Utah 1998) (1.26 to 1); Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.
(Crookston ID, 860 P.2d 937, 940-41 (Utah 1993) (4.9 to 1).
9
The trial court found that Westgate's net worth was $500 million. The extrapolated
award of $33 million represents approximately 6% of that net worth.

court did so only after finding that the defendant's conduct was personal, involved
breaches of fiduciary duty, and that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was an
otherwise permissible 5.5 to 1. Id. ^[ 43, 48. Were the award here within the permissible
range of punitive damages, Westgate's wealth might permit an award near the high end
of that range. But the trial court's reliance on Westgate's wealth led it to disregard that
range entirely. Properly analyzed, Westgate's net worth does not justify a departure from
the presumptive ratio.
3.

The Nature of Westgate's Conduct

Westgate's conduct is not of the kind that justifies an extreme departure from
presumptive ratios. While the jury found punitive damages were appropriate, that is true
in all cases triggering this analysis. Under Utah law, the nature of a defendant's conduct,
along with the facts and circumstances surrounding that conduct and the probability that
the conduct will occur again in the future, "are subsumed in the 'reprehensibility'
guidepost established in Gore as part of the federal punitive damages excessiveness
analysis." Id As has been established, the consumers in this case suffered minor
economic harm. The jury concluded that no consumer suffered pain and suffering,
personal injury, or other non-economic harm. Because the harm was solely economic,
each consumer obtained a full remedy by virtue of the compensatory damages awards.
Further, the consumers who attended Westgate presentations were not vulnerable
individuals—many testified that they were selected because they met certain income
criteria—and several were savvy enough to try to "game the system" by claiming their
gifts without even considering the purchase of a Westgate timeshare, a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
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In addition, two important considerations arise under this prong that require
independent analysis under Utah law. First, in examining the nature of misconduct, the
court distinguishes between fraud that involves a breach of fiduciary duty and "gardenvariety" fraud. Diversified Holdings, 2002 UT 129, f 18. That distinction is premised on
the United States Supreme Court's recognition that "'[while] infliction of economic
injury . . . can warrant a substantial penalty... this observation does not convert all acts
that cause economic harm into torts that are sufficiently reprehensible to justify a
significant sanction in addition to compensatory damages.'" Id (quoting B.M.W. of
North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 576 (1996)). Put more simply, the court
concluded that "[p]unitive damages awards should reflect a different degree of culpability
for 'garden-variety' fraud as opposed to its more egregious forms." Id.
The distinction is borne out in the different punitive damages awards considered
by the Utah Supreme Court. Where a breach of fiduciary duty is involved, ratios like 9 to
1, 5.5 to 1, and 4.9 to 1 are appropriate. State Farm III, 2004 UT 34, f 1; Fairfax Realty,
2003 UT 41, ff 33, 48; Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 940-41. But where a breach of
fiduciary duty is not involved, ratios in the neighborhood of 2 to 1 and 1.26 to 1 are
appropriate. Diversified Holdings, 2002 UT 129, |33; Hah, 959 P.2d at 110. Given the
nature of Westgate's conduct, the trial court should have followed the presumptive ratio.
Moreover, the fact that punitive damages may be awarded in this case arises from
the confluence of contract remedies and fraud remedies. That is, the plaintiff who is
fraudulently induced to enter into a contract is entitled to the same remedy as for breach
of that contract—the benefit of the bargain—but not punitive damages. Dugan v. Jones,
615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). Thus, in this case only the consequential damages

arise from fraud, as the $500 portion of the awards are benefit-of-the-bargain contract
damages, as evidenced by the fact that the jury awarded prejudgment interest for contract
damages only to the $500 portion of awards. For that reason, the ratios approved by the
trial court are even larger—not only are the punitive damages 138 times greater than the
total compensatory awards, they are 4,132 times greater than the fraud-based
compensatory awards. The trial court should have reduced the punitive damages awards
to presumptive ratios and used only fraud damages in those ratios.
4.

The Facts and Circumstances Surrounding Westgate's Conduct

The facts and circumstances surrounding Westgate's conduct also indicate that the
punitive damages awards are grossly excessive. This factor permits "a more subjective
inquiry into what the defendant knew and what was motivating his or her actions."
Diversified Holdings, 2002 UT 129, f 19. In applying this factor, the court has made
clear that "[w]hile [the] motive of making money regardless of legal... duties is hardly
admirable," that motive, standing alone, provides "no evidence of intentions or actions so
profoundly reprehensible as to merit punitive damages beyond ordinary measures." Id
Notably, in Diversified Holdings this court affirmed a 2 to 1 ratio where the defendant
defrauded plaintiffs outof $70,000. Id f 33. Here, the consumers were not defrauded
out of any money. At most, they spent time listening to a sale presentation in exchange
for a certificate. In Diversified, the court concluded that in circumstances much more
egregious, the defendant's actions did "not merit punitive damages significantly outside"
presumptively permissible levels. Id. ^ 19. The same is true here.

5.

Effect of Westgate's Conduct on the Consumers and Others

Westgate's conduct also did not result in consequences that justify an award above
the presumptive ratio. This factor requires inquiry into whether a defendant's conduct
had a "widespread effect on groups of vulnerable victims or a devastating impact on the
plaintiff." Id. 120. Neither indicator is present here. The consumers here were simply
asked by Westgate to attend a sales presentation to give Westgate the opportunity to
persuade them to purchase a timeshare. As potential timeshare purchasers, they were not
financially vulnerable. And the impact of the conduct was far from "devastating." Many
consumers testified that they attended Westgate's sales presentations with no intent to
purchase, a breach of the implied covenant. Several consumers returned to Westgate,
even after experiencing frustration with the Anaheim Certificate, because they wanted
another free gift. These customers could not have relied upon the representation of the
value of the certificate as their basis for attending the sales presentation. The effects of
Westgate's conduct were not so severe that Westgate must be punished in an amount
"outside the range usually deemed adequate." Id.
6.

The Possibility of Future Recurrence

The possibility that Westgate will, in the future, engage in conduct similar to the
conduct in this case does not justify a departure from the presumptive ratio. Id. f 21.
Relevant to this inquiry is whether a defendant's conduct is likely a "one-time occurrence
. . . so that future misconduct under the same circumstances is not foreseeable." Fairfax
Realty, 2003 UT 41, ^f 42. Also relevant is whether legal proceedings alone are sufficient
to deter future misconduct or whether a party "holds in contempt any legal procedure that
would censure his conduct." Diversified Holdings, 2002 UT 129,fflf21-22.

Importantly, even where this factor provides the "most compelling" basis for a
substantial punitive damages award, that does not "support[] a result different from that
which an analysis of the other six.. .factors suggests." Id So, for instance, where a
defendant had "demonstrated an incredibly arrogant and uncaring attitude on the stand
when asked about [his conduct]," the defendant's conduct is an insufficient indicator of
recidivism to justify a ratio greater than 2 to 1. Id. It is enough that the punitive damages
awards would give the defendant "some pause before he chooses to pursue fraudulent
courses of action in the future." Id. Westgate has long ceased using the Anaheim
Certificate, which was created and administered by a third-party independent contractor.
Westgate's other sales incentives—several of which the claimants here used—were not at
issue at trial. And Westgate has no previous or subsequent history of similarly
troublesome incentive packages. Westgate is not going to engage in the same conduct in
the future and endure 7 more years of litigation.10
7.

The Relationship of the Parties

The relationship between the consumers and Westgate also does not justify
departing from the presumptive ratio. Westgate's program was simply a form of
advertising to encourage prospective timeshare purchasers to visit Westgate's resort. The
Anaheim Certificate and Westgate's other shopping, dining, golf and ski certificates were
offered, as with many forms of advertising, to incentivize the recipient to respond. But
10

Westgate acknowledges that this court has considered a defendant's refusal to repent as
a predictor of recidivism. Like with a prisoner maintaining his actual innocence before a
parole board, however, this creates a Hobson's choice for the defendant. By drawing this
court's attention to the limited harm and the fact that consumers did not have fiduciary
relationships with Westgate, Westgate seeks only to characterize its conduct, not deny its
liability for the benefit of the bargain. Westgate urges this court not to construe its
attempt to defend itself as the obstreperous protests of an irredeemable recidivist.
AA

offering a gift to a responder does not make Westgate a fiduciary. The Utah Supreme
Court has consistently distinguished between fraud involving fiduciaries and fraud
involving parties in arm's-length contracts. To this end, "[t]he greater the trust reposed in
a defendant, the greater will be the justification for a more significant award of punitive
damages." Id. f 23. The trial court correctly noted that there was no fiduciary
relationship in this case. But the court then concluded that the consumers did place "a
degree of trust" in Westgate. The court departed from traditional punitive damages ratios
in part because Westgate breached that trust.
But as discussed, the trust consumers placed in Westgate is of the type all
defrauded plaintiffs place in others and in no way resembles the trust between an insurer
and an insured, State Farm III, 2004 UT 34, f 27, partners in a business, Fairfax Realty,
2003 UT 41, ff 43-44, or a real estate agent and his clients, Diversified Holdings, 2002
UT 129, Tf 23. Here, the jury found a contractual relationship existed. But that contract
was the culmination of an arm's-length transaction. Indeed, the nature of these
transactions indicates a remarkably low amount of trust placed in Westgate.
Notably, even in cases involving a fiduciary duty, awards must still be within
single-digit ratios. State Farm HI, 2004 UT 34, f 1; Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT 41, ^ 33,
48; Crookston II, 860 P.2d at 940-41. Where the court has considered parties engaging in
an arm's-length transaction, it has held that a punitive damages award "of...
approximately two times the amount of fraud damages suffered by the plaintiff, will serve
as an adequate punishment and deterrence." Diversified Holdings, 2002 UT 129, f 33.
In conclusion, this case warrants the presumptive 2 to 1 ratio approved in
Diversified Holdings. Both cases involved garden-variety fraud. Both cases arose from

arm's-length transactions. Both cases involved only economic damages fully remedied
by the compensatory award. In both cases, the litigation will serve, and indeed already
has served, as a deterrent against future misconduct. And, while the defendant in
Diversified defrauded plaintiffs out of more than $70,000, the consumers in this case lost
only their time. Accordingly, this court should remit the punitive damages awards to an
amount no greater than twice the amount of economic damages.
Conclusion
Westgate is entitled to a new trial of the consumer claims that is conducted in a
non-prejudicial manner under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 42. The court also should
grant a new trial on punitive damages that is conducted to afford Westgate procedural due
process. In the alternative, the court should order a remittitur of the punitive damages
award under both federal substantive due process and Utah law.
DATED this 15th day of October, 2010.
SNELL & WILMER L.L.P.
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BSf THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
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ORDER REGARDING WESTGATE
RESORTS, LTD.'S MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION

vs.
SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,
Civil No. 020404068
Defendants.
Division No. 8
SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Counterclaimants,
vs.
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD,
Counterdefendant.
Westgate Resorts, Ltd., ("Westgate") filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay this
Court's proceedings, which came regularly before the Court on September 16, 2008 at the hour

of 1:00 p.m. Richard W. Epstein and Rebecca F. Bratter appeared in behalf of Westgate; L. Rich
Humpherys, Karra J. Porter, and Scot A. Boyd appeared in behalf of Consumer Protection Group,
LLC ("CPG").
The Court considered the memoranda submitted by the parties and the oral argument,
together with all other information contained in the file. The Court issues the following findings
and conclusions:
1.

The Court is unable to determine whether the statutory language of Utah Code Ann.

§76-10-1605 (3), as amended, mandates that any claims made under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act ("UPUA"),, which claims are grounded in fraud, must be decided exclusively by
arbitration pursuant to the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act ("UUAA"), § 78B-31a-101, et seq. The
applicable language of section 76-10-1605 (3), which uses the words, "subject to" is unclear. The
Court therefore cannot find or conclude that such language would give exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction to the arbitrators in an arbitration pursuant to UUAA. Accordingly, the court cannot
address the issue of waiver.
2.

Regardless of whether the words "subject to" conveys exclusive subject matter

jurisdiction to the arbitrators, the Court finds and concludes that such language does allow the
UPUA claims founded in fraud to be arbitrated pursuant to UUAA.
3.

The Court finds and concludes that though the motion has been filed late in the

proceedings, it is appropriate and reasonable to compel arbitration, and there is wisdom in having
the UPUA claims of CPG arbitrated given the circumstances in this case, including: (a) the over 900
claims based on communications fraud; (b) the repetitive nature of much of the evidence that would
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relate to each of the claims; (c) the discretion of arbitrators to consider evidence without confusion
of facts regarding the liability and damages and the applicable law; (d) the complexity regarding
statutory violations and the recoverable damages under the statute; (e) the advantage of allowing
testimony and evidence to be submitted in different ways in arbitration (rather than repeated
appearances of witnesses), which would decrease the potential cost and prejudice to everyone
involved.; and (f) denying the motion to arbitrate would result in further significant delays since
Westgate would have, and would exercise, an immediate right to appeal.
4.

The parties have stipulated that all of the discovery that has taken place in the

present action may be used and applied in the arbitration proceedings. The Court finds that the
stipulation is reasonable and appropriate as to twenty-eight claimants (pursuant to the previous
scheduling orders of this court, discovery has been completed as it relates to the following
claimants: George Baty, Holly and Jon Beck, Karen and Howard Brandt, Kristy and Stephen
Brower, Darren and Irene Davis, David and Kristen Detienne, Larry and Sherrill Dorius, Diane
Eastman, Diane and Robert Ellis, Karen and Kurtis Heser, Susan Hubbard, Luanne and Mark
Huntington, Byard and Joan Price, Darla and George Serassio, Rodney Sorensen, Greg and
Relda White).
5.

The Court finds and concludes that the arbitrators will be able to promptly address

the UPUA claims efficiently and in a cost effective manner.
6.

The Court finds and concludes that there is no reasonable basis to stay the claims

based upon common lawfraudand contract (the seventh and eighth causes of action), since the
resolution of the arbitration proceedings may not finally resolve the claims based upon common

3

law fraud and will not resolved the claims based on contract. Staying these claims would result
in further delays and potential serious prejudice to the parties and, since it may take years to fully
resolve the arbitration proceedings, and if stayed, the Court would then have to deal with the
claims of common law fraud and contract in any event. Delaying the resolution of the common
law fraud and contract claims may result in faded memories, the unavailability of certain
witnesses and otherwise stale evidence. In addition, these claims are severable from the UPUA
claims.
7»

Under the circumstances of this case, witnesses may be required to testify

multiple times. The Court finds that staying the proceedings would not be reasonable, but more
imposing and prejudicial to the parties and to the witnesses. If the matters were stayed, it may
require all of the witnesses to return multiple times many years from now.
8.

The Court therefore concludes that arbitration would be in the best interest of the

parties as it relates to the UPUA claims and proceeding to trial with the common law fraud and
contract claims would be the most appropriate way to resolve the non UPUA claims with the
least prejudice, imposition and cost.
Based upon the above findings and conclusions, the Court issues the order set forth
below.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Westgate's motion to compel arbitration regarding the Utah Pattern of Unlawful

Activity ("UPUA") claims is granted. The trial of the UPUA claims shall therefore be cancelled
and these claims instead shall be arbitrated pursuant to the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, § 78B-

4

11-101, et seq. Each party shall have twenty (20) days from the date of this order in which to
designate an arbitrator. These two arbitrators will select the third arbitrator. All of the discovery
by the parties in the present action shall be applicable to the arbitration proceedings and the
parties may use the discovery accordingly. This matter is now many years old and the Court
orders that the arbitration proceedings be handled as expeditiously as reasonably possible.
2.

Westgate's motion to stay the non-UPUA causes of action is denied.

DATED this J : / d a y of September, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

Approved as to form:
GREENSPOON MARDER

Richard W. Epstein
Attorneys for Westgate Resorts, Ltd
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day of September, 2008, a true and correct copy of the
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Richard W. Epstein
Robby H. Birnbaum
Rebecca F. Bratter
GREENSPOON MARDER
Trade Center South, Suite 700
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1

will be harmful to

2

simply to benefit

3

themselves
the other

party.

"Finally, you cannot use this

4

unwritten promise to achieve an

5

outcome that you believe is fair

6

but is inconsistent with

7

actual terms of the

8
9

contract.

"If you find that
Resorts violated

the

this

Westgate
unwritten

10

promise to deal fairly and in good

11

faith with the consumer,

12

W e s t g a t e violated

13

Number

14

"Consumer

15

entitled

16

consumers's damages from

17

Resorts if the consumer

18

everything

19

promised

20

and Westgate Resorts failed to do

21

what it had promised to do under

22

the

23

Number 52, Expectation

24

"If a consumer was damaged by a

25

breach of the contract

the

then

contract."

51, Damages for

Nonperformance.

Protection Group is
to recover

the
Westgate
did

that he or she had

to do under the

contract

contract."
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Damages

with

General

nvyvCHIUCI
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:

Resoi j
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+ K O ~ Westgate

is liable to- -^e damage

in,

om the

breach as *«, * ! -Jws

the loss

of the benefit", f i "in

rontract

caused by Westgate's breach
(2) any costs or uihe-i

minus

loss that

thtj consumer has avoided by not
havi ng to perform "
52A,

sequential Damages for Breach of

Contract (Implied Covenant of Good Faith and I HI r
Deali n g ) .
"If the contract * *h • •*•
was breached by

»--»ic.umer

.

ts,

then Westgate Resorts < a^s:
liable for "consequent!

ges*

•IP breach of the
contract.
"Con sequinf »-j I damages are
those losses reasonably w ithin the
contemplation of the par 1: i es , 11 \at
is, they could have considered the
damages or reasonably foreseen
t hf• HI , d t t h<•' t i m^

tho

made.

LitiCourt LLC
a m _c

contract was

1

"In order to decide whether a

2

loss was foreseeable at the time

3

the contract was made, you should

4

examine the nature and language of

5

the contract and the reasonable

6

expectations of the parties.

7

loss may be foreseeable because it

8

would naturally

flow from the

9

contract breach

(1) in the

A

10

ordinary course of events, or (2)

11

as a result of special

12

circumstances, beyond the ordinary

13

course of events, that

14

Resorts had reason to know or to

15

expect would

16

Westgate

occur.

"However, you may not award

17

damages under this claim for

18

breach of contract:

19

distress,

20

the consumers

21

the contract, or (3) for mileage

22

or other automobile or travel

23

expense."

24

Next we turn to fraud.

25

with issues of contract to this point in time.

(1) emotional

(2) the time expended by
in connection

CitiCourt, LLC
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with

We've been

dealing
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surrounding c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

You

may consider any statement made or
acts done by W e s t g a t e Resorts and
all other facts and

circumstances

which indicate intent.

You may

draw the inference and find
person intends the natural

the
and

probable c o n s e q u e n c e s of acts
knowingly

done."

Number 60, Reasonable

Reliance.

"You must decide whether
consumer's

each

reliance on the

false

statement was reasonable under
circumstances.

the

To do so, you may

consider his or her age,
intelligence, experience,

mental

c o n d i t i o n , and k n o w l e d g e ,

along

with his or her relationship

to

W e s t g a t e Resorts and access to
i nformati on."
Number 61, Compensatory

Damages for

"If you decide that CPG has
by clear and convincing

proven

evidence

that W e s t g a t e Resorts defrauded a
c o n s u m e r , then you must

CitiCourt, LLC

also

Fraud

1

decide how much money is needed to

2

fairly compensate for any damages

3

to that particular consumer caused

4

by the fraud.

5

you, you must consider each

6

consumer claim separately, and any

7

damages, if any, you decide to

8

award each consumer must be based

9

solely on the evidence presented

As I've

instructed

10

by that consumer.

11

consider any evidence of damages

12

presented by any other consumer

13

when you evaluate each particular

14

consumer's

15

You may not

claim.

"There are two kinds of

16

damages that you may award:

17

economic, and (2) noneconomic.

18

deciding how much money the

19

consumer has been damaged, a kind

20

of economic damages, you should

21

determine the difference between

22

(1) the value of what Westgate

23

Resorts promised to give the

24

consumer if Westgate Resorts'

25

false statements had been true,

CitiCourt, LLC

(1)
In

2400

Huveiiiuer 1 3 , ZU08

and,

(2) the value of what the

consumer actually

received.

"You should determine the
total amount that the consumer was
damaged as a consequence of his or
her reliance on Westgate's
statement.

false

You must consider the

following:
"(1) You may award

damages

for expenses the consumer
reasonably

incurred caused by

Westgate R e s o r t s 1

fraud.

These

are also a kind of economic
damages.

However, the expenses

must have been

reasonably

foreseeable from Westgate
fraud.

Resorts1

Consumer Protection

must prove these damages
reasonable certainty.

Group

with

You may

not, however, award damages for
the time expended by the consumer
or for mileage or other
or travel

automobile

expense.

"(2) You may also award
damages for the emotional

CitiCourt, LLC
ani

c o o i A AH

distress

1

caused by Westgate Resorts' false

2

statement if the emotional

3

distress was a natural and

4

proximate result of Westgate

5

Resorts' fraud.

6

of noneconomic damages."

7

Number 62, Noneconomic Damages Defined

8

"Noneconomic damages are not

9

capable of being exactly

These are a kind

measured,

10

and there is no fixed

11

standard or formula for

12

Noneconomic damages must still be

13

awarded even though they may be

14

difficult to compute.

15

duty to make this determination

16

with calm and reasonable

17

The law does not require the

18

testimony of any witness to

19

establish the amount of

20

noneconomic damages.

21

rule,
them.

It is your

judgment.

"While you may not award

22

damages based upon

23

the law requires only that the

24

evidence provide a reasonable

25

basis for assessing the damages

speculation,

CitiCourt, LLC
801-532-3441
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but does not require a
mathematical

certainty."

Number 63, Proof of Damages.
"To be entitled to damages, Consumer
Protection Group must prove two
points:

First, that damages

occurred to the consumers, and
there must be a reasonable
probability, not just

speculation,

that the consumer suffered

damages

from Westgate Resorts' fault.
"Second, the amount of
damages of each consumer.

The

level of evidence required to
prove the amount of damages is not
as high as what is required to
prove the occurrence of damages.
There must still be evidence, not
just speculation, that gives a
reasonable estimate of the amount
of damages, but the law does not
require a mathematical

certainty.

"In other words, if Consumer
Protection Group has proved that
the consumer has been damaged and

CitiCourt, LLC
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1

to you, there is a reason why it says proper

2

punishment and as a wholesome warning to o t h e r s .

3

Now, others doesn't necessarily

4

Westgate.

5

exemplary d a m a g e s .

6

example for the industry to o t h e r s , a wholesome

7

warning to others not to offend in like manner, so

8

punitive damages now takes a very broad,

9

purpose in policy

10

Punitive damage is also sometimes

mean

It's an example.

called

It's to set an

broad

decision.

Now, when we're addressing the punitive

11

damages, we need to appreciate that Exhibit -- I

12

don't remember which number.

13

2400 Anaheim c e r t i f i c a t e s .

14

2400 people received this deceptive

15

Now, we believe there was a lot more

16

Mr. Wagner from MDI said that he sent

17

3700 tours to W e s t g a t e , and it was the primary

18

sponsor of this c e r t i f i c a t e .

19

There were invoices for
We know that at least
certificate.
involved.
approximately

Now, is it exactly 3700 or 2400 or some

20

number in between, we don't know, but we also know

21

that there were hundreds of people that were

22

persuaded not to take it after they have already

23

duped by coming into Westgate at The Canyons and had

24

gone through the sales presentation and they were

25

talked out of taking that and took a different
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1

dissuade them from ever engaging in this kind of

2

conduct again, and then we do it among 15.

3

need to do that, so I'm going to suggest a way that I

4

think would be fair so that we don't have duplication

5

and yet we fulfill the purpose of punitive d a m a g e s .

6

But we

It would be wrong for you to assume that

7

what is awarded in punitive damages in these 15

8

verdicts are only going to go to these 15 c o n s u m e r s .

9

You need not concern yourselves with where the

10

money's going to go on the punitive d a m a g e s .

The

11

Court will administer and decide how that money is

12

disbursed and addressed, but it would be wrong to

13

assume that this money would go to these 15 people,

14

or just to these 15 I should say.

15

All right.

So if we look at taking the

16

profit out of the fraud, one of the things that I

17

would suggest we look at -- we can look at it in two

18

or three different w a y s .

19

have tours.

20

One can be the fact that we

As we just heard from both Mr. Crabtree

21

and also Mr. Gissy, that they computed

22

these tours or the volume per tour, which

23

to a monetary value, of about $1200 per tour, and

24

that the tours that were involved in the Anaheim

25

certificate were somewhere between $2400 and $ 3 7 0 0 ,

CitiCourt, LLC
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the value of
converted
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say around $3,000, we then have a figure of about
$3.6 million.
JUDGE DAVIS:

I think you misspoke,

Counsel when you said $3,000.
MR. HUMPHERYS:

You mean 3,000 tours?

Tours.

Pardon me.

Thank

you, Judge.
That would equate to just the value per
tour times the number of certificates would be
approximately $3.6 million.
Now, let's look at it in a different
The promised gift was $500.

We have, again,

somewhere between 2400 and 3700 tours that used
certificate.

way.

this

If you take just the cost or what was

promised as the value times 3,000, which is about in
the middle of that range, that equals

about

$1.5 mi 11 ion.
Now, as I talk about that, we need to
appreciate all that does is get us to restitution.
Five hundred dollars that should have been paid
the beginning is an amount of 1.5.

from

That doesn't

even

talk about punishment, it doesn't talk about
deterrence.
So what amount in a large corporation
as this is it going to take to make sure that
company doesn't engage in this kind of

CitiCourt, LLC
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this

fraudulent

such
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behavior

ever

again?

Now, w e ' v e heard
market

has been affected

you've

heard

He has every
of e s t i m a t e .
because

when

know.

fixed

he said

the value

this scheme was being

$100 m i l l i o n
profitability

and net equity

to $517 m i l l i o n

would

amount

but we do know

in 2 0 0 0 ,

the time

was around

so in seven

years the

of this company

pleads

went up

$519 m i l l i o n .

not p o v e r t y ,

that

not be the right way to put it, but c e r t a i n l y

pleads

that

the f i n a n c i a l
it, don't

c r i s i s has had its e f f e c t .

I don't

doubt

enjoyed

a profit

generated

doesn't

complain

a bit.

So what
company

otherwise,

pain, since
in order

Utah we will

from this

suggest

scheme,

sure

and it

to you is t h i s :

needs to feel

to make

come

it a bit, but it has

a corporation

not accept

and don't

doubt

I would

such as W e s t g a t e

financial

scheme

an audited

-- or $519 m i l l i o n ?

Now, W e s t g a t e

it up to y o u .
by way

perpetrated,

to $ 1 5 0 m i l l i o n ,

or not

their v a l u e

by a c c o u n t a n t s ,

that

Whether

I leave

to d o w n p l a y

how the

few m o n t h s , and

estimate.

He can't do much with

that's

from what

I don't

incentive

a bit about

in the last

Mr. C r a b t r e e ' s

it's b e l i e v a b l e ,

quite

some type of

feels

no pain

it knows

that in

this kind of

fraudulent

into Utah ever

again with

CitiCourt, LLC
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kind of approach, and if all we're doing is making
them pay the $500 that they promised to pay, that's
not paying.

That's what they agreed to pay already.

It has to be something higher than that.
If we punish them, or try to punish them
for an amount less than that, I suggest that Westgate
then ends up gaining on the d e a l , making something on
the deal, because if the profit isn't

regurgitated,

if the money that is promised, the $500, is not taken
away from them, then they end up with a net gain and
none for the wear -- no worse for the w e a r .

When

they get caught once in awhile and have to pay some
smaller amount, it never gets to the point where it
becomes u n p r o f i t a b l e for them to do it.
Now, this is a perfect example of why
punitive damages have to be large.

It's taken us

three weeks to try 15 couples out of hundreds and
hundreds and hundreds out of the 2400 to 3700 tours
that had this gift c e r t i f i c a t e .
Can you see the purpose and wisdom of
having punitive damages awarded?

Because it is in

our legal system nearly impossible to try and
litigate the entire matter or we'd be here for y e a r s ,
and so that is the primary purpose of punitive damage
is to make sure that on a one time basis we can

CitiCourt, LLC

1

address

this as a w h o l e .

2

All

right.

3

MR.

EPSTEIN:

4

that e n t i r e

5

improper

Now

Objection.

last d i a l o g u e .

JUDGE

7

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

8

Instruction,

9

jury must

the c o n d u c t

11

I'm

13

this c a s e ,

14

something

You may

EPSTEIN:

17

case,

to do with

DAVIS:

that

is it not, C o u n s e l ,

the

19

JUDGE

20

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

DAVIS:

in your g l a s s e s .

and

that.

it's

that, or the w i t n e s s e s

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :

25

Jury
the
of

others.

involved

the jury

I do think

18

24

In the

The c o n s u m e r s

else t h a t ' s not b e f o r e

to the c o n s u m e r s

23

Sure.

Counsel.

thing.

it has n o t h i n g

16

the other

respond,

is item Number 4, the effect

that very

JUDGE

22

strike

entirely

on the lives of the c o n s u m e r s

MR.

glare

it's

Your H o n o r , one of the things

addressing

12

DAVIS:

consider

10

21

I think

I move to

argument.

6

15

--

This
at

in
is

all.

restricted

before

this

reference?

Are you t a l k i n g

to me?

Yes.
Oh, I'm

sorry.

I thought you were

There's
looking

way.
For p u n i t i v e

compensatory,

d a m a g e s , no, Your

Honor;

for

yes.

JUDGE

DAVIS:

Well, compensatory,

CitiCourt, LLC

clearly,

2648
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but as it relates to punitive damages, read the
generic -- whether it's generic or whether
individualized.

it's

We have -- some of it's generic.

The probability of future reoccurrence of
the misconduct, you have the facts and

circumstances

surrounding such conduct, you have the effect of the
conduct on the lives of the consumers and o t h e r s .
MR. HUMPHERYS:
JUDGE DAVIS:
MR. HUMPHERYS:

That's right, and others.
Okay.
And that's the point.

All

punitive damage claims relate to the entirety, and it
also goes to the reprehensibility of the conduct.
JUDGE DAVIS:
MR. HUMPHERYS:
MR. EPSTEIN:

I'll allow it.
All

right.

Just so it's clear so I

understand it, I want to make sure I understand

for

purposes of this record that he's able to argue that
punitive damages can be awarded for the entire group
of people that might have been affected by this
particular premium incentive program; is that
JUDGE DAVIS:

right?

He may argue the facts and

circumstances surrounding the conduct, the nature of
the alleged conduct, the relative wealth of W e s t g a t e
Resorts, the effect of the conduct on the lives of
the consumers and o t h e r s , the probability of future

CitiCourt, LLC

1

recurrence and m i s c o n d u c t ,

the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the

2

parties and the amount of actual damages awarded.

3

long as he's confined

4

Instruction

to that, that's

76 relative to punitive

5

MR. H U M P H E R Y S :
is a p p r o p r i a t e :

the

damages.

Here's what I would

6

suggest

7

per tour that was promised

8

were to take that figure and times three, times

9

of the people who have been subjected

If we were to take the

$500

and not given, and if you
all

to this

10

fraudulent

11

$4.5 million

12

d a m a g e s , and if you were to divide that into 15,

13

which are the number of verdicts that you have, I

14

believe the math is $300,000

15

As

scheme, I believe that the figure of
is an appropriate

I again emphasize

award for

punitive

each.
it would be wrong

to

16

assume that if we divide it up into 15, which

is

17

nothing more than a logistical way to address

before

18

you, it is not the basis upon which the award

is

19

given to any one person, then it would be wrong

20

assume o t h e r w i s e , and I believe that that is what

21

necessary to catch the attention of the

22

company

23

using them even after they knew and how fraudulent

24

was and how little they've done and how

25

remorse they have shown at all in this

to
is

timeshare

that is using these kinds of tactics and kept

CitiCourt, LLC
QA1

C3->

OvlVM

little
particular

it
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UTAH CO'JNfTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.

Civil No. 020404068

WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Gregory and Relda White
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Gregory and Relda White?
2.

Yes

A^

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Gregory and Relda White?

Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Gregory and Relda White?

Yes

\

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Gregory and
Relda White?

Yes

\

No

5.

If you answered "yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Gregory and Relda
White?

Yes
6.

X

No

If you answered "yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Gregory and Relda White?

7.

Economic damage

$

S^O

Non Economic damage

$

<Q

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Gregory and Relda White?
Yes

y"

No

DATED this _ T ^ day of November, 2008.

G^l

i - P-lSzcb*

Y FORE PERSON
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Rod Sorensen
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Rod Sorensen?
2.

Yes

X

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Rod Sorensen?
Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Rod Sorensen?

Yes

)(

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Rod Sorensen?

Yes

X

No

5.

If you answered

ct

yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Rod Sorensen?
Yes
6.

X

No

If you answered "yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Rod Sorensen?

7.

Economic damage

$

Non Economic damage

$

SCSC)
(3

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Rod Sorensen?
Yes

X

DATED this / < / ^ d a y of November, 2008.

W ^ F O R E PERSON

2

No
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATC RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Byard and Joan Price
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Byard and Joan Price?
2.

Yes

^(

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Byard and Joan Price?
Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Byard and Joan Price?
Yes

\

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.

4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Byard and Joan
Price?

Yes
5.

X

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Byard and Joan
Price?

Yes
6.

X

No

If you answered "yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Byard and Joan Price?

7*

Economic damage

$

Non Economic damage

$

S

^0
O

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Byard and Joan Price?
Yes

X

DATED this IH^- day of November, 2008.

^ S l K Y F O R E PERSON

9

No
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Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Mark and Luanne Huntington
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Mark and Luanne Huntington?
2.

Yes

) ^

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Mark and Luanne Huntington?
Yes
3.

V

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Mark and Luanne Huntington?
Yes

X

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.

4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Mark and
Luanne Huntington?
5.

If you answered

Yes
ct

) \

No

yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Mark and Luanne
Huntington?
6.

Yes

X

No

If you answered "yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Mark and Luanne Huntington?

7.

Economic damage

$

SOCS

Non Economic damage

$

Q

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Mark and Luanne Huntington?

Yes

y

DATED this M& day of November, 2008.

YFOREPERSON

2

No
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.

Civil No. 020404068

WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
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Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Susan Hubbard
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Susan Hubbard?
2.

Yes

X

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Susan Hubbard?
Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Susan Hubbard?

Yes

X.

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Susan
Hubbard?

Yes

X

No

$

5.

If you answered "yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Susan Hubbard?
Yes
6.

X

No

If you answered "yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Susan Hubbard?

7.

Economic damage

$

5&

Non Economic damage

$____£)

^

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Susan Hubbard?
Yes

/

No

DATED this / Y ^ d a y of November, 2008.

<^t

JURY FORE PERSON

?

PILED
WV I 4 2 0 0 8 ^

JN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
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CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.
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WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Kurtis and Karen Heser
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Kurtis and Karen Heser?
2.

Yes

J\

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Kurtis and Karen Heser?
Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Kurtis and Karen Heser?

Yes

y

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Kurtis and
Karen Heser?

Yes

X

No

5.

If you answered "yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Kurtis and Karen
Heser?

Yes
6.

/(*

No

If you answered ccyes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Kurtis and Karen Heser?

7.

If you answered

Economic damage

$

Non Economic damage

$

S^S
Q

<c

yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Kurtis and Karen Heser?
Yes

X

No

DATED this K ^ d a y of November, 2008.

'

JURYFORE PERSON

2

\f

)

^

^

^
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CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,
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vs.
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WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Robert and Diane Ellis
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Robert and Diane Ellis?
2.

Yes

X

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Robert and Diane Ellis?
Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Robert and Diane Ellis?

Yes

/K

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Robert and
Diane Ellis?

Yes

X

No

5.

If you answered

iC

yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Robert and Diane
Ellis?

Yes
6.

A

No

If you answered ccyes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Robert and Diane Ellis?

7.

Economic damage

$

Si 6>

Non Economic damage

$

Q

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Robert and Diane Ellis?
Yes

X

DATED this / Y ^ day of November, 2008.

TflmYFOREPERS ON

2

No
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CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
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Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Diane Eastman
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Diane Eastman?
2.

Yes

X

No

If you answered <cyes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Diane Eastman?
Yes
3.

X

No

Do youfindby a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Diane Eastman?

Yes

X

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Diane
Eastman?

Yes

Y

No

5.

If you answered "yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Diane Eastman?
Yes
6.

X

No

If you answered "yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Diane Eastman?
Economic damage
Non Economic damage
7.

$

Q

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally jfraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Diane Eastman?
Yes

y(

DATED this / Y ^ a y of November, 2008.

J U R ^ O R E PERSON

2

No
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Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Larry and Sherriil Dorius
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Larry and Sherriil Dorius?
2.

Yes

X

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Larry and Sherriil Dorius?
Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Larry and Sherriil Dorius?

Yes

X

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Larry and
Sherriil Dorius?

Yes

\X

No

5.

ct

If you answered

yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Larry and Sherrill
Dorius?
6.

Yes

X

No

If you answered c<yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Larry and Sherrill Dorius?

7.

If you answered

Economic damage

$_

Non Economic damage

$

Sec
(J

<c

yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Larry and Sherrill Dorius?

Yes

DATED this

ffi

X

day of November, 2008.

JfJRY FORE PERSON

2

No
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Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

David and Kristen Detienne
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on David and Kristen Detienne?
2.

Yes

yK

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to David and Kristen Detienne?
Yes
3-

A

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and David and Kristen Detienne? Yes

X

. No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with David and
Kristen Detienne?

Yes

} \

No

5.

If you answered "yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to David and Kristen
Detienne?
6.

Yes

s\

No

If you answered "yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to David and Kristen Detienne?

7.

If you answered

cc

Economic damage

$

Non Economic damage

$

£ j> 0
\J

yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of David and Kristen Detienne?

Yes

DATED this n

day of November, 2008.

7

X

No
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Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Darren and Irene Davis
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Darren and Irene Davis?
2.

Yes

/(

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Darren and Irene Davis?

Yes
3-

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Darren and Irene Davis?

Yes

X

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Darren and
Irene Davis?

Yes

X

No
n n / n r> o

5.

If you answered "yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Darren and Irene
Davis?

Yes
6.

^

No

If you answered "yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Darren and Irene Davis?
Economic damage
Non Economic damage
7.

$_

t)

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Darren and Irene Davis?
Yes

DATED this (H

X

No

day of November, 2008.

^ > ^ s

JUKY*FORE PERSON

2

004781
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Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Stephen and Kristy Brower
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Stephen and Kristy Brower?
2.

Yes

/\

No

If you answered ccyes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Stephen and Kristy Brower?

Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Stephen and Kristy Brower? Yes

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Stephen and
Kristy Brower?

Yes

X

No

5.

If you answered

<4

yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Stephen and Kristy
Brower?
6.

Yes

/K

No

If you answered tcyes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Stephen and Kristy Brower?

7.

Economic damage

$

Non Economic damage

$

3 1 J
(J

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willfiil and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Stephen and Kristy Brower?

Yes

DATED this \^

day of November, 2008.

2

X

No

FILED
NOV 1 4 2 0 0 8 ^

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SPECIAL VERDICT

CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
i

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Howard and Karen Brandt
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Howard and Karen Brandt?
2.

Yes

s\

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Howard and Karen Brandt?
Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Howard and Karen Brandt?

Yes

X

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Howard and
Karen Brandt?

Yes

Vf

No

5.

If you answered "yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Howard and Karen
Brandt?
6.

Yes

X

No

If you answered "yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Howard and Karen Brandt?
Economic damage

Non Economic damage
7.

n
$__v/

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Howard and Karen Brandt?

Yes
DATED thi^ff

X

day of November, 2008.

IY FORE PERSON

2

No

FILED
NOV 1 4 2008
4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SPECIAL VERDICT

CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

Holly and Jon Beck
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on Holly and Jon Beck?
2.

Yes

)C

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to Holly and Jon Beck?

Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and Holly and Jon Beck?

Yes

X

No

If yon answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with Holly and Jon
Beck?

Yes

)C

No

_

5.

If you answered

cc

yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to Holly and Jon Beck?
Yes
6.

X

No

If you answered ctyes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to Holly and Jon Beck?

7.

Economic damage

$_

Non Economic damage

$

(J

If you answered "yes55 to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of Holly and Jon Beck?
Yes

DATED this | 4

/

day of November, 2008.

JURY FORE PERSON

2

No

FILED
NOV 1 4 2 0 0 8 ^
4THp,STRICT

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

UTAH COUNTY

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the instructions the court has given you.
Re:

George Baty
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on George Baty?
2.

Yes

^\

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to George Baty?

Yes
3.

X

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and George Baty?

Yes

X

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.
4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with George Baty?

Yes X

No

5.

If you answered

<c

yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to George Baty?
Yes
6.

X,

No

If you answered ctyes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to George Baty?

7.

Economic damage

$

Z^OQ

Non Economic damage

$

Q

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of George Baty?
Yes

DATED this ( ^

X

No

day of November, 2008.

j£S f.' ^
JU#V FORE PERSON

2

NOV I 4
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

r H 1 ^ OF UTAH
UTAH CO ^ T Y

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.

Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Robert and Diane Ellis
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?

Yes
2.

X

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

DATED this / y f - d a y of November, 2008.

JURY FORE PERSON

No

200^

FILED
NOV 1 4 2 0 0 ^
4THJDISTRJCT
UTAH CCJ *NTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.

Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Rod Sorensen
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?
Yes

2.

X

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

$ £6,666.6?-

DATED this / V ^ l a y of November, 2008.

NOV 1 4 2008
4TH DISTRICT
STATE CF UTAH
UTAH CO' !NTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.

Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Byard and Joan Price
1.

Do youfindthat punitive damages should be awarded?

Yes
2.

X

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

DATED this / y ^ d a y of November, 2008.

^ e. ££

— ^ ^ ^

JURY FORE PERSON

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

*^

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Diane Eastman
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?
Yes

2.

X

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?
$ (pG> f C>GC Co f-

DATED this / Y ^ day of November, 2008.

JURY FORE PERSON

NOV 1 4 20
4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH CO* JNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.

Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Mark and Luanne Huntington
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?
Yes

2.

X

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

DATED this fj f - day of November, 2008.

^C^,

ft V^e^e^.

JURY FORE PERSON

NOV 1 4 2008

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAHCCMNTY

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.

Civil No. 020404068

WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Susan Hubbard
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?
Yes

2.

X

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

DATED this A * * day of November, 2008.

~ ^ 2 £*£-***

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Kurtis and Karen Heser
1•

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?

Yes
2.

A

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?
$

C>(ofGG(o'(>^

DATED this Z^—day of November, 2008.

c ^ e ^ f , lt&JURY FORE PERSON

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Larry and Sherrill Dorius
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?

Yes
2.

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

DATED this _ / l ^ d a y of November, 2008.

X,

No

NOV I 4

TN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the coxirt
has given you.
Re:

David and Kristen Detienne
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?
Yes

2.

X

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

DATED this / ^ d a y of November, 2008.

JURY FORE PERSON

No

iof

FILED
NOV 1 4 200
4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH CO' »NTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Gregory and Relda White
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?

No

Yes .X)
2.

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

$ Cd^ebfn
DATED this |*T*

day of November, 2008.

P
;

<

^

/

JURY FORE PERSON

FILED
NOV 1 4 zoo)
4TH DISTRICT

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

UTAH CO- 5NTY

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.

Civil No. 020404068

WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instractions the court
has given you.
Re:

Holly and Jon Beck
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?

Yes
2.

X

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

$ &666.P
DATED this 1^

day of November, 2008.

FILED
NOV 1 4 2008
4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.

Civil No. 020404068

WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Darren and Irene Davis
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?

Yes X
2.

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

$ fattGXn
DATED this f*f

day of November, 2008.

/jyRY FORE PERSON

004761

FILED
NOV 1 4 200(T
4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.

Civil No. 020404068

WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Stephen and Kristy Brower
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?
Yes

2.

3c

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

$ aua.c-i
DATED this M

day of November, 2008.

FILED
NOV 1 4 2008 )ffl
4TH DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.

Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

Howard and Karen Brandt
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?

Yes A
2.

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

$ 66,6frU7
DATED this ( ^

day of November, 2008.

^JjyRY FORE PERSON

nn^FiQ

FILED
NOV 1 4 200$
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

STATE OF UTAH
UTA

Hcouis/r7

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

SPECIAL VERDICT REGARDING
PUNITIVE DAMAGES

vs.
Civil No. 020404068
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Please answer the following questions based on the evidence and instructions the court
has given you.
Re:

George Batv
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?
Yes / ^

2.

No

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

$ QLl&.Ci
DATED this ( ^

day of November, 2008.

JURf FORE PERSON

TabE

FILED
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fWEOFUTAH
UWHCOOWY

L. Rich Humpherys, 1582
Karra J. Porter, 5223
Scot A. Boyd, 9503
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 323-5000
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant Consumer Protection Group, LLC.
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP'S
JUDGMENT AGAINST WESTGATE
RESORTS, LTD ON SPECIAL
VERDICTS

SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,
Defendants.

Civil No. 020404068
Division No. 8

SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Counterclaimants,
vs.
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Counterdefendant.
Trial in the above matter came regularly before the court commencing October 27,2008
and concluding on November 14,2008. Consumer Protection Group appeared and was

represented by its attorneys L. Rich Humpherys, Karra J. Porter and Scot A. Boyd; Westgate
Resorts appeared through its attorneys Richard W. Epstein and Rebecca F. Bratter. A jury was
regularly impaneled and sworn to try said action. Witnesses on the part of both sides were sworn
and examined, exhibits were submitted, and all evidence was adduced by the parties. Having
considered the evidence, arguments of counsel and the instructions of the court, the jury first
retired to consider the fifteen special verdicts as it related to the claims of each of the following
consumers: George Baty, Holly and Jon Beck, Karen and Howard Brandt, Kristy and Stephen
Brower, Darren and Irene Davis, David and Kristen Detienne, Larry and Sherrill Dorius, Diane
Eastman, Diane and Robert Ellis, Karen and Kurtis Heser, Susan Hubbard, Luanne and Mark
Huntington, Byard and Joan Price, Rodney Sorensen, Greg and Relda White. After deliberating,
it returned its special verdicts and answered the interrogatories as it related to each consumer as
follows:
1.

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that Westgate Resorts committed

fraud on [each consumer's name]?
2.

Yes X

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 1 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct was a cause of damage to [each consumer's name]?
YesJL
3.

No

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a contract between

Westgate Resorts and [each consumer's name]?

Yes X

No

If you answered "no" to question number 3 above, do not answer questions 4 or 5.

2

4.

Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Westgate Resorts violated

the implied terms of good faith and fair dealing in a contractual relationship with [each
consumer's name]?
5.

Yes X

No

If you answered "yes" to question number 4 above, do you find by a

preponderance of the evidence that such violation was a cause of damage to [each consumer's
name]?

Yes X_
6.

No

If you answered "yes" to either question number 2 or 5 above, what if any damage

do you award to [each consumer's name]?
[George Baty]

[Holly and Jon Beck]

[Howard and Karen Brandt]

[Stephen and Kristy Brower]

[Darren and Irene Davis]

[David and Kristen Detienne]

[Larry and Sherrill Dorius]

Economic damage

$ 500.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 508.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 500.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 517.00

Non Economic damage

$

0

Economic damage

$

5.00

Non Economic damage

$

0

Economic damage

$ 550.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 500.00

Non Economic damage

$

0

0

0

0

0

[Diane Eastman]

[Robert and Diane Ellis]

[Kurtis and Karen Heser]

[Susan Hubbard]

[Mark and Luanne Huntington]

[Byard and Joan Price]

[Rodney Sorensen]

[Gregory and Relda White]

7.

Economic damage

$ 517.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 515.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 535.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 505.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 500.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 540.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 500.00

Non Economic damage

$

Economic damage

$ 550.00

Non Economic damage

$

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

If you answered "yes" to questions 1 and 2 above, do you find by clear and

convincing evidence that the actions of Westgate Resorts were the result of willful and malicious
or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of [each consumer's name]?
Yes X

4

No

After the jury reached the above verdicts, the trial moved into the punitive damage phase,
where each party called an additional witness and submitted evidence. After each party rested,
the court then gave additional jury instructions. After deliberating a second time, it returned its
special verdicts regarding punitive damages and answered the interrogatories as it related to each
consumer as follows:
1.

Do you find that punitive damages should be awarded?
Yes X

2.

If your answer to No. 1 is yes, how much?

[George Baty]

$66,666.67

[Holly and Jon Beck]

$66,666.67

[Howard and Karen Brandt]

$66,666.67

[Stephen and Kristy Brower]

$66,666.67

[Darren and Irene Davis]

$66,666.67

[David and Kristen Detienne]

$66,666.67

[Larry and Sherrill Dorius]

$66,666.67

[Diane Eastman]

$66,666.67

[Robert and Diane Ellis]

$66,666.67

[Kurtis and Karen Heser]

$66,666.67

[Susan Hubbard]

$66,666.67

[Mark and Luanne Huntington]

$66,666.67

[Byard and Joan Price]

$66,666.67

No

[Rodney Sorensen]

$66,666.67

[Gregory and Relda White]

$66,666.67

Following the reading of each verdict, the jury was polled and confirmed that this was
their verdict.
Pursuant to Section 15-1-1(2), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, Consumer Protection
Group is entitled to pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum on each $500 award, the
represented value of the trip to Anaheim, California, commencing from the date of the filing of
the counterclaim herein (October 23, 2002) until the date hereof, calculated as follows:
Total amount for 14 trips to Anaheim, California
(excluding Darren and Irene Davis who eventually
received their trip)

$7,000.00

Interest at the rate of 10% per annum
from October 23, 2002 until December 1, 2008
(6 years and 39 days)

$4,274.79

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that
counter claimant Consumer Protection Group, LLC shall have judgment against Westgate
Resorts, LTD for the amount of $11,516.79 for compensatory damages, including prejudgment
interest, and $1,000,000.05 in punitive damages. Court costs shall be awarded pursuant to Rule
54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This judgment shall bear post-judgment interest at the
legal rate from the date hereof until paid.

6

By stipulation of the parties, the issue of attorneys fees shall be determined hereafter.
Dated this

/ / ^ d a y of December, 2008.
BY THE CO

<&5S&<

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 17th day of November, 2008, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing CONSUMER PROTECTION GROUP'S JUDGMENT AGAINST WESTGATE
RESORTS, LTD ON SPECIAL VERDICTS was served:
Todd Shaughnessy
David P. Williams
SNELL & WILMER
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

by facsimile, email and Hand delivery

Richard W. Epstein
Robby H. Birnbaum
Rebecca F. Bratter
GREENSPOON MARDER
Trade Center South, Suite 700
100 West Cypress Creek Road
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2140

by facsimile, email and US Mail

^sJjf/C
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
RULE 54(b) ORDER

WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Date: April 6,2010

SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

Case No.: 020404068

Defendants.
Judge: Lynn W. Davis
SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
Counterdefendant.

This matter comes before the court on several outstanding motions: Westgate's Combined
Motions for: I) Judgment as a Matter of Law, ii) for New Trial iii) and for a Remittitur ("Combined
Motions"); CPG's Motion to Award and Determine the Amount of Attorney's Fees and Litigation
Expenses ("Attorney Fees Motion"); and CPG's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements ("Costs
Memo"). Oral argument was held on February 16,2010. Shaun S. Adel and Consumer Protection
Page 1 of 30

Group, LLC, ("CPG") were represented by L. Rich Humpherys, Karra J. Porter, and Scot A. Boyd.
Westgate Resorts, LTD., ("Westgate") was represented by Richard W. Epstein. The court, having
carefully reviewed the parties' memoranda, hereby rules as follows:
I.
Procedural History
1.

Westgate filed its Combined Motions and supporting memorandum on January 16, 2009.

2.

CPG filed its memorandum of opposition on February 26, 2009.

3.

On March 4, 2009, Westgate filed its Costs Memo.

4.

On March 25, 2009, Westgate replied to CPG's opposition memorandum.

5.

CPG filed its Attorney Fees Motion and supporting memorandum on June 11,2009.

6.

On July 15, 2009, Westgate filed its opposition to the Attorney Fees Motion.

7.

On August 12,2009, CPG filed its reply in support of the Attorney Fees Motion.

8.

The court heard oral arguments in the case on February 16,2010, stating that it would
rule in writing.
II.
Factual Background
At a 10-day jury trial held in October and November of 2008, the jury found Westgate

liable for fraud against 15 Plaintiff Consumers. The compensatory damages for the Consumers
ranged from $5 to $550 each. The jury awarded punitive damages totaling $1 million, or
$66,666.67 for each Consumer.
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Other facts, many of which are disputed, will be discussed in later sections in this ruling.
ffl.
Standards of Review
When reviewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law on the basis of insufficiency of
evidence, the Utah Supreme Court stated: "we follow one standard of review: We reverse only if,
viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the prevailing party, we conclude that the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict" Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 2001
UT 77, U 33, 31 P.3d 557; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b).
To prevail on a motion for a new trial, a party must prove one of the grounds in Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). A judge may set aside a verdict and order a new trial "when the
verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or whenever in the exercise of a sound
discretion the trial judge thinks this action necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice."
Crookston v. Fire Ins, Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 803 n.15 (Utah 1991).
A remittitur is appropriate if the court determines that the jury awarded "excessive . . .
damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." Utah R.
Civ. P. 59(a)(5). However, there is a "strong presumption in favor of jury verdicts." Judd ex rel
Montgomery v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, ^ 58, 103 P3d 135. The party opposing a properly
supported remittitur "has the choice of accepting the reduction or seeking a new trial." Id
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IV.
The Parties' Arguments
1.

WESTGATE'S COMBINED MOTIONS (I) FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW, (II) FOR A NEW TRIAL, AND (HI) FOR A REMITTITUR.

a,

Westgate's Arguments in Support of its Combined Motions
Westgate argues for judgment as a matter of law, or for a new trial or remittitur for six

reasons: (1) CPG solicited assignments in bad faith; (2) CPG's tctest trial" adversely affected
Westgate's rights and relaxed CPG's burden of proof and overwhelmed the jury with evidence
that would have been inadmissible in any individual case; (3) CPG's common law fraud claim
failed because of the economic loss rule; CPG did not show Westgate was responsible for other
parties' behavior, and fraud was not proved by clear and convincing evidence; (4) Westgate had
no proper claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) insufficient
evidence of malice, by clear and convincing evidence, to support the punitive damages award,
and (6) the punitive damages amounts are excessive under Utah law and the U.S. Constitution.
The arguments are reviewed in order:
(1) Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., shows that a court may
invalidate assignments obtained in bad faith and not for ordinary business purposes. 128 S.Ct.
2531 (U.S. 2008). Westgate argues that invalidation is appropriate here because CPG based its
counterclaim on information stolen from Westgate and on an offer to the Consumers for a "risk
free," "no obligation" opportunity to share in the proceeds of Westgate's misconduct.
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(2) Westgate argues that the trial was fundamentally unfair because as a mass
consolidation of unrelated claims, expediency was valued above basic fairness. Westgate5 s right
to defend itself against each individual claim was sacrificed to supposed judicial efficiency.
Evidence of other Consumer claimants should have been inadmissible under Rule of
Evidence 404(b). Westgate was entitled to an order precluding CPG from relying on the
testimony of other litigants in their suits against Westgate. Courts are typically reluctant to lump
together multiple claims against a defendant because of its high likelihood to substantially
prejudice a jury. See Anderson v. First Commodity Corp. oj Boston, 618 F.Supp. 262 (W.D.
Wise. 1985). Westgate argues that it should have had the right to adequately and vigorously
present material defenses unique to each claimant. See In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W. 2d 606, 61112 (Tex. 1998).
Here, the jury was likely confused by various testimonies of Consumers who had
differing experiences with Westgate: Some attended multiple presentations and others attended
only one, some received a digital camera and some received a certificate to Anaheim, some never
attempted to redeem a certificate and others attempted numerous times to redeem.
Westgate contends that some or all of this evidence violates Utah Rule of Evidence 403
(prejudice substantially outweighed probative value), Rule 402 (each Consumer's evidence was
not relevant to other Consumers), and Rule 404(b) (evidence for one Consumer not admissible to
how Westgate acted toward other Consumers).
(3) Westgate contends that the economic loss rule should have prevented any recovery
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because any alleged injuries were based on contract breaches. The common law fraud claims
should have failed because each Consumer knew the terms and conditions of the offers before
attending the sales presentations. Thus, all Consumers ratified their agreements and waived any
right to assert fraud as a ground to avoid the agreement. Further, one Consumer admitted to not
following up with travel arrangements, another admitted to not using the digital camera, and one
Consumer even admitted to attending the presentation, receiving the Anaheim cert, and traveling.
Thus, Westgate argues that tort claims should not have been allowed to give the
Consumers license to avoid the contractual bargains they made.
Further, there was insufficient evidence that Westgate was vicariously liable for MDI or
NRC's conduct in soliciting the Consumers, or offering them the Anaheim Cert, which was not a
regular aspect of Westgate's business. Westgate had no control or authority, nor was it in any
way responsible, for the acts of MDI or NRC, and Westgate should not have been found liable
for their conduct.
Moreover, CPG did not prove the nine elements of common law fraud by clear and
convincing evidence. Each Consumer received a confirmation that contained the terms and
conditions of the tour and the premium before traveling. They attended the presentation on the
date agreed to and confirmed in the letter before they traveled to the resort and expended any
time or resources. Thus, there is a lack of detrimental reliance. Again, the Consumers ratified
their agreements by their acts. There was also no evidence of statements known to be false at the
time they were made by Westgate. The Consumers failed to show specific injuries that were a
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result of reliance on allegedly false statements. Finally, the Consumers failed to mitigate any
alleged damages.
(4) Westgate asserts that the breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claim fails for three reasons. First, there was no showing of new, independent rights or duties
agreed upon by the parties. Second, CPG failed to show that Westgate was responsible for the
conduct of MDI or NRC. Third, CPG failed to establish special, general, or consequential
damages.
(5) Westgate argues there was no legal basis on which to award punitive damages.
Punitives are awarded only in exceptional cases where the defendant acts maliciously, with
fraudulent intent or with a reckless indifference or disregard for the rights of others. When a
defendant acts with an honest but mistaken belief, then punitive damages are inappropriate.
It is clear that the jury here ignored its oath to compensate Consumers only for their
individual discrete transactions with Westgate, not to punish Westgate based solely on the sheer
number of suing Consumers. Each of these claims would have been unmemorable standing
alone, and would clearly not merit any kind of punitive damages. However, apparently the jury
improperly believed the claims that dozens or hundreds of people were defrauded and that
therefore Westgate ought to be punished severely.
Also, because there was a lack of proof that Westgate authorized the acts of NRC or
MDI, Westgate should not have been punished for any malicious acts of either of those two
entities.
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(6) Finally, the punitive damages awards exceeded constitutional boundaries. In recent
years, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken steps to curb the outrageous punitive damage verdicts
recklessly awarded by juries in civil cases. Under Utah law, seven factors "must be considered"
before assessing the propriety of a punitive damages award. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange,
817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991). A key factor is the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages, a
1-to-l ratio being presumptively acceptable. It is rarely appropriate for the ratio to exceed 3 to 1.
Id. at 810. In Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., a 9-to-l ratio was allowed because the
defendant caused emotional distress and humiliation that was highly egregious. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424-25. The key factors were whether the harm was
physical or economic, whether the harm showed reckless disregard for the safety or health of
others, whether the plaintiff had financial vulnerability, and whether intentional malice existed.
Westgate argues that those factors show that the current punitive damage award is not only too
high, but should be reduced to at most a 1-to-l ratio. This is proper where there was no physical
harm or emotional harm to the Consumers.
Based on the foregoing, Westgate requests judgment in its favor. Alternatively, the court
must either enter a remittitur or hold a new trial to prevent a miscarriage of justice,
b.

CPG's Memorandum in Opposition to Westgate's Combined Motions
CPG argues that Westgate violated the rule of viewing all evidence in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party's outcome. See Child v. Child, 2008 UT App 338, H 2,194 P.3d
205. Westgate seems to act as if it is obvious that the jury erred, but this is only because
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Westgate bases its motion on its skewed version of the facts and on legal arguments that it has
repeatedly already lost.
Westgate presents six reasons why it should be granted judgment as a matter of law.
CPG responds in order:
(1) CPG contends that Westgate presented no evidence at trial that the information was
stolen. This assertion is made frequently throughout Westgate's memorandum to try to appeal to
the court's sense of equitable justice. However, although counsel for Westgate promised the jury
in opening statements that it would give evidence of the supposed theft, it never did so, failing to
call as a witness Carolyn Workman. Further, CPG's alleged bad faith or improper motives is oftasserted by Westgate, but without any supporting evidence. The court has heard and rejected
Westgate's arguments, and it is wasteful for Westgate to continually rehash these issues.
(2) CPG argues that Westgate admitted that the fraud claims can be collectively litigated,
or consolidated. Now it argues that its constitutional rights were violated. Rule 42, as well as
Rule of Evidence 404(b), allows for consolidation. The claims were related, and the evidence of
other acts showing intent, plan, preparation, motive, or knowledge were clearly admissible.
Using Westgate's language from its own memorandum, the "check-the-box" claims, presented in
testimony of "mind numbing redundancy" reveal the striking similarity of Consumers' claims.
Further, each claimant was required to prove each element of his or her claim, and each
claimant did so at trial. The jury was clearly instructed on this point, and Westgate cannot now
claim just because it lost that this did not occur. Any other arguments Westgate has made against
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consolidation have been heard and rejected.
(3) The court has already ruled that the economic loss rule does not apply to claims of
fraud, including fraud in the inducement. CPG contends that there was overwhelming evidence
supporting the jury's finding of agency and the direct liability of Westgate. Westgate5 s own
employees acted inappropriately, yet Westgate clearly ignores that fact. It can only point to Mr.
Wagner's self-motivated testimony, which the jury was not required to believe, especially
because it was so weakened during cross-examination.
CPG further argues that there was clear and convincing evidence of fraud. Again,
Westgate has a problem with presenting only its side of the story, and ignoring CPG's version of
the facts which the jury rightfully chose to believe. Further, Westgate failed to present any
evidence that the Consumers failed to mitigate their damages.
(4) CPG argues that Westgate's claim that the breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing cause of action fails is not supported by any legal precedent or factual evidence.
Further, the special damages award is clearly appropriate because at least $500 was within the
contemplation of the parties since that was the amount used to lure Consumers to Park City.
(5) CPG contends that for the record to show no finding of legal malice by clear and
convincing evidence, the court must construe all the evidence in Westgate's favor. Of course,
this is not the standard in a motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, and it is clear
that Westgate ignores the same evidence that the jury found persuasive. There are many cases
where a defendant committed fraud and is required to pay punitive damages, but Westgate
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ignores such cases. The jury clearly found bad faith and fraud, and did not "ignore its oath" or
become "inflamed" as claimed by Westgate. Moreover, the three references to thousands or
10,000 claims of fraud were struck by the court, so it is unlikely the jury considered those in the
midst of a 10-day trial. Further, Westgate opened the door to any such isolated comments when
Mr. Wagner claimed there were very few complaints regarding the Anaheim Certificate.
(6) CPG argues that Westgate5 s constitutional and common-law arguments against the
punitive damages award is groundless. The verdict is not contrary to state law, in that the jury
did indeed consider the seven Crookston factors as detailed in Jury Instruction No. 76. The
factors were clearly met. For example, Westgate's net wealth in 2007 was about
$500,000,000.00, and during the year before trial the company generated $1 billion in gross
revenue. Further, the scheme was longstanding, highly profitable and deliberately fraudulent.
This was not a few isolated events. Further, lack of remorse is a factor to be considered, because
it is a high predictor of recidivism. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 2004 UT 34, ff
29, 35, 98 P.3d 409. Westgate5 s Combined Motions, and its constant attempts to shift blame
onto other entities, including the Consumers themselves, show no remorse. Westgate, despite the
findings of a jury and overwhelming evidence of fraud and bad faith, continues to believe it has
done nothing wrong. This causes the public to lose trust in large corporate entities, and such
gross, egregious behavior ought to be punished in the name of the public good.
As to the argument against the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages, courts have
acknowledged that the ratio factor has limited or no application in cases where the compensatory
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damages are small. In a case where a defendant received a $1 compensatory judgment, the court
stated that a $9 punitive damages award would have been too low, and that this "somewhat
ridiculous outcome demonstrates why multipliers in these types of cases are not appropriate."
Bjornson v. Dave Smith Motors/Frontier Leasing & Sales, 578 F.Supp. 2d 1269, 1284 (D. Idaho
2008). Another court, in upholding a 187-to-l ratio punitive damages award, stated that "[t]he
smaller the compensatory damages, the higher the ratio of punitives to compensatory damages
has to be in order to fulfill the objectives of awarding punitive damages." Bennett v. Reynolds,
242 S.W.3d 866,-904-05 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
CPG claims that if the punitive damages were as low as a 1-to-l ratio, it would have been
virtually impossible for Westgate's misconduct to be brought to light or to an end. See Mathias
v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.2d 672, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2003). The punitive damages
award is still relatively small compared with Westgate's net wealth, less than one percent of
Westgate's claimed wealth as of the date of trial. This is assuming that Westgate received no
bailout money. Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld a punitive damage award of $34,000
against a defendant whose annual income was $40,000 and net worth was $12,000. See Burton
Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, fb 27-28,186 P.3d 1012.
Finally, CPG argues that the punitive damages award does not violate the U.S.
Constitution. The ratio is all but meaningless in cases with small compensatory damages awards.
Reprehensibility, too, does not weigh in Westgate's favor. The conduct was repeated, was the
result of malice and deceit, and was motivated by profits with no concern for the Consumers.
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Another guidepost, though Westgate is silent on this point, is that Westgate faced a tough civil
penalty for engaging in fraudulent marketing tactics. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-19-3(a).
Finally, Westgate argues that the jury in this case impermissibly considered harm to
others. However, Philip Morris USA v. Williams states that a jury can consider harm to others in
determining reprehensibility. 549 U.S. 346, 349, 353-55 (2007). Further, counsel for Westgate
stipulated to a jury instruction consistent with this statement, and it cannot now complain that the
jury followed that jury instruction.
Based on the foregoing, CPG asks this court to deny Westgate's motions for judgment as
a matter of law, for a new trial, and/or for a remittitur.
c.

Westgate's Reply Arguments to CPG's Opposition Memorandum
Westgate emphasized that the court had already ruled that CPG's method of obtaining the

information was wrongful, and this was the law of the case. Westgate has preserved its objection
to the court's pretrial ruling that the Consumers' assignments to CPG would not be invalidated
on the basis of Mrs. Workman's theft of the information. Westgate takes issue with CPG's
objection of its ability to argue issues on which the court has already ruled. If CPG is correct,
then virtually all post-trial motions would be disallowed because they are based on arguments
made during and before trial.
As to Westgate's second argument, it is clear that the consolidation of the 15 claims
deprived Westgate of a fair trial. Westgate includes much case law to support its argument, very
little of which was distinguished by CPG.
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As to the economic loss argument, Westgate argues that CPG never properly responded to
the ratification conclusion. Also, CPG has failed to show proof of the elements of common law
fraud. The fraud claims were not assignable and the court never ruled that they were.
Westgate reiterated its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arguments, adding
that CPG avoided even trying to respond to Westgate's cited case law.
Westgate argues that the conduct in the cases that exceeded 3-to-l punitive to
compensatory damages ratios was found to be clearly reprehensible, unlike the instant case. In
two cases cited approvingly by CPG, the ratio was 1.2 to 1 and .25 to 1. In fact, all the cases
cited by CPG averaged a ratio of 4 to 1. This is well within the single-digit ratio nearly mandated
by the United States Supreme Court. As to the seven Crookston factors, Westgate provides
arguments as to why those factors merit a finding of low punitive damages.
CPG mis-cited case law when claiming that a court would refuse to limit punitive
damages to $9 when compensatory damages were $1. Further, the other cases with small
compensatory damages and triple-to-quadruple-digit multiplied punitive damages do not reflect
Utah law and all predate the U.S. Supreme Court's controlling Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
decision. 128 S.Ct. 2605 (2008).
Further, the nominal damages cases involve situations where there are no provable
amount of actual damages, such as defamation per se, false arrest, excessive force, or unlawful
strip searches. However, in this case, actual damages were awarded, and none of the awards are
nominal. Therefore, the punitive damages still must fall within a reasonable ratio compared with
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the compensatory damages. Many of the rulings cited by CPG would likely have been
overturned or reversed after Exxon, where the U.S. Supreme Court limited the ratio to 1 to 1 in a
lawsuit arising from one of the worst environmental disasters in history.
Westgate contends that it is likely that the jury improperly punished Westgate for alleged
harm to others, rather than merely considering harm to others as one factor in its decision.
Westgate notes that based on CPG's arguments at trial, it will be precluded from seeking separate
punitive damages to these others because CPG argued at trial the necessity of ensuring sufficient
punitives on a one-time basis. CPG argues that there is no evidence or proof that the jury
punished Westgate for harms to non-parties: However, "[h]ow can we know whether a jury, in
taking into account harm caused to others under the rubric of reprehensibility, also seeks to
punish the defendant from having caused injuries to others?" Phillip Morris, 549 U.S. at 357.
Further, a single-digit ratio is appropriate in nearly all cases, with only exceptional cases
exceeding that ratio. This case is not exceptional.
Westgate reiterates its request for judgment in its favor or for a new trial, or at least to a
reduction of the punitive damages to a 1-to-l ratio with the compensatory damages.
2.

CPG'S MOTION TO AWARD AND DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES

d.

CPG's Arguments Supporting its Attorney Fees Motion
CPG seeks reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses based on (1) the jury's finding

of fraud, (2) the jury's finding of breach of implied duties of good faith and fair dealing, (3) the
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court's inherent equitable powers, and (4) the private attorney general doctrine.
As to (1), the Utah Supreme Court recognizes that attorney fees generally are not
recoverable without a contract or statutory provision. However, in cases of bad faith or fraud or
stubborn litigiousness, attorney fees are appropriate. In Crookston, the Utah Supreme Court held
that all attorney fees were proper upon the jury's finding of fraud. Id at 798. In the instant case,
there were many consumers who were potential targets of Westgate's fraud. The claims are
relatively small making it economically infeasible to pursue each claim without attorney fees and
expenses being awarded. Further, Westgate continues to fight the claims and rejects any
responsibility for its actions, necessitating extensive litigation for the Consumers to achieve
justice.
As to (2), the Utah Supreme Court has allowed recovery of attorney fees and expenses
where there is a finding of breach of good faith and fair dealing. The court stated and reaffirmed
that awarding attorney fees against insurers who violate the implied covenant helps ccto remove
any incentive for insurers to breach the duty of good faith." Billings v. Union Bankers Ins, Co.,
918 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah 1996). Further, employers who breach the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing are liable for attorney fees and litigation expenses. Heslop v. Bank ofUtah^
839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). CPG argues that this case is no different than the insurance and
employment cases. Westgate, without having to pay for attorney fees and litigation expenses,
would be incentivized to defraud individual consumers, knowing that each would only receive a
compensatory award of a few hundred dollars. Without the attorneys fees and litigation expense
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award, consumers would not be in the financial position to address the breach of implied
contractual duties and would not have the funds to hold Westgate and its ilk accountable for
fraud.
As to (3), attorney fees are awardable where a court deems it in the interests of justice and
equity. Trial courts have wide latitude to award attorney fees, without statutory or contractual
authorization, as they see fit See Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22,121, 89 P.3d 148. A clear
public policy that serves the interests of justice and equity is to discourage fraud, especially when
a large corporation defrauds dozens or hundreds of unsuspecting consumers. This case is the
poster child for awarding attorney fees and litigation expenses equitably, as each Consumer was
awarded between $5 and $550, and the fees and expenses far exceeded those amounts. After
years of litigation and weeks of trial, the fees and expenses works out to be about $35,000 per
consumer.
As to (4), the private attorney general doctrine is applicable here. This is one method for
granting equitable awards of attorney fees. See Utahnsfor Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v.
Rowlings, 2007 UT 97, f 5, 175 P.3d 1036. In Culbertson v. Bd of County Comm frs of Salt
Lake County, the court clarified several standards in assessing attorney fees under the private
attorney general doctrine. 2008 UT App 22. First, curbing the wilful disregard of the law is an
important public policy. Id at ^ 14. Also important is whether the conduct of the defendant
would have remained unchallenged but for the action of the plaintiff. Id at <J 18.
Here, the court can help prevent and punish a large number of small frauds against
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Utahns, which comports with important public policy. The breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is not to be tolerated, and this case will serve as a warning to other
corporations who intend to defraud others. The case also reinforces the notion among the general
public that corporations who breach the trust and respect of consumers will be answerable for
their actions. Further, CPG's costs incurred in the case were so high that subsidization is needed.
Finally, the case is extraordinary, and but for CPG and the claimants joining forces to fight
injustice, Westgate might still be defrauding consumers today.
CPG also argues that the amount claimed for attorney fees and expenses is reasonable.
The case was hard-fought, difficult, and complex, as shown by the highly technical legal issues in
the parties' memoranda. It required much knowledge of time shares, vacation products,
marketing procedures, and many experts and out-of-state witnesses to testify. The trial lasted
three weeks. There were two dozen witnesses and 28 exhibits. The preparation for trial was
extensive and required multiple attorneys and law clerks from two law firms logging many hours.
Primary counsel for CPG, Rich Humpherys, specialized in trial litigation for 32 years and has
extensive experience in the areas of fraud and implied duties of good faith and fair dealing. The
hourly rates were reasonable based on the experience, the time expended, and the risk of loss.
Based on the foregoing, CPG seeks attorney fees and litigation expenses as detailed in the
Declaration of L. Rich Humpherys Regarding Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses.
e.

Westgate's Opposition Arguments to CPG's Fees and Expenses Memorandum
Westgate views this motion as unnecessary until the court first entertains and decides its
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Combined Motions for relief. However, if the court chooses to hear both motions, then Westgate
requests an evidentiary hearing in order to introduce evidence opposing CPG's entitlement to
attorney fees and litigation expenses.
Utah law only allows attorney fees and expenses as authorized by contract or statutory
law, with very few exceptions not relevant here. Courts frequently strike down attorney fees
awards where they are based merely on equitable concerns.
Westgate argues that CPG is not entitled to attorney fees and litigation expenses. The
cases cited by CPG involve either insurance companies or employment claims. There is no case
law supporting equitable awards for fraud. Therefore, the cases are not helpful or persuasive.
Further, Westgate contends that CPG is wrong in its claim that courts allow recovery for
breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Again, this is only true in the
insurance and employment context. Westgate is not an insurance company, nor did Westgate
employ (or refuse to employ) the defendants. Therefore, the cases cited are inapposite.
Westgate asserts that attorney fees are not awardable here in the interests of justice and
equity. The Hughes case cited by CPG involved egregious breaches of fiduciary duties and the
violation of a trust. Once again, the case is distinguishable, and does not apply to Westgate.
Further, if anybody should appeal to justice and equity in this case, it is Westgate, as the entire
lawsuit against it was based on theft of confidential information. Moreover, where appropriate, a
class action can be used to aggregate many related claims of injured plaintiffs. It was not
available here due to CPG's own greed, because it suffered no injury and therefore would not
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have been allowed involvement as a plaintiff in a class action suit against Westgate.
Westgate argues that the private attorney general doctrine simply does not apply, as the
defendant should be a governmental entity and the plaintiff should sue to benefit all citizens
harmed by the government's conduct. None of the cited cases have any relevance to this action.
CPG simply ignores important details and tries to craft new law changing the American rule on
attorney fees. The case here is not exceptional, there is no statute or contract authorizing attorney
fees, statutes and other remedies would have protected CPG's assignors had CPG not interfered
and interjected itself as a claimant in this lawsuit.
Finally, Westgate argues that even if the court finds entitlement to attorney fees and
expenses, the amount claimed here is unreasonable. Thus, if needed, Westgate requests a hearing
to determine reasonableness of fees.
Westgate observes that the declaration of Rich Humpherys contains only vague
descriptions of the legal services rendered, and no description of the legal services sought by
CPG. Westgate cannot respond specifically to determine how much time and expenses was
needed to pursue CPG's claims as opposed to other services performed which were unrelated to
the assigned claims. Also, CPG's request for appellate attorney fees is improper.
£

CPG's Reply Arguments For Attorney Fees and Litigation Expenses
CPG observes that Westgate continues its practice of ignoring the jury verdict and any

evidence supporting it. Again, Westgate portrays itself as a victim of theft and a good-faith
litigant throughout the case.
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that courts have removed insurance companies' incentive to act improperly does not mean that
Ihr; doctrine does nol apply to other companies.
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allows the court to hold Westgate responsible for expensive, aggressive litigation to avoid being
held accountable for fraud.
As to the private attorney general doctrine, CPG seeks to perform the function of a private
attorney general, benefitting the public by exposing wide-scalefiraudof a large corporation. This
is certainly not an ordinary case, and awards are upheld for such extraordinary cases.
Finally, Westgate did not sufficiently challenge the reasonableness of the attorney fees
sought. The court has discretion as to whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, and if the court
chooses to do so, CPG requests that the hearing occur at the same time as the hearing on
Westgate's Combined Motions.
3.

CPG's VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

g.

Westgate's Response Arguments to CPG's Costs Memo
Westgate argues that CPG failed to serve the memorandum of costs within the five-day

period set forth in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2), and is therefore not entitled to costs.
Rule 54(d)(2) provides that costs, assessed based on a verified memorandum, are to be
awarded to a prevailing party provided that they are served within five days after entry of
judgment. The court entered its judgment on the jury verdict on December 11,2008. CPG did
not serve the required memorandum until December 23,2008. Such delay is fatal to CPG's
claim for recovery.
!k

CPG's Reply Argument Supporting its Costs Memo
CPG responds by arguing that the court's entry ofjudgment on December 11,2008, was
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request costs within five day s of the trial court's final, appealable judgment..." Aurora Credit
Servs., !nc v Libvitv Wvsi Dev Int., 1007'
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° 3d 465, Therefore, the

memorandum of costs was not untimely.
Because there are hundreds of remaining unresolved claims, under Rule 54(b), there has
in »l h m i a final juili'nn,

- \ttbjO" t to revision as to the adjudicated

consumers because of Westgate's pending post-trial motions.
Based on tlic foregoing, CPG argues that its Costs Memo should be considered to have
been served and filed on the date that thi

.?.

^
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December 11, 2008, Judgment Against Westgate Resorts, LTD on Special Verdicts.

Case Analysis
a.

Westgate's Combined Motions Are Denied.
In considering amotion lor (tidf'iiit'ttf ;t» j ifiitifrr n( l^t^ , (lit mini i», mindful nl »i«; role of

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, i.e., CPG. A reversal of
ilu, flit! venlid i* ii|i|HH|viiiik. unit il tin.; tvidence is insufficient to support that verdict. Further,
a court may grant a new trial when the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of Idt t vitli in c oi
when one of the other grounds in Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) are proven.
The court notes that Westgate com leniently fa iled to present evidence supporting the jury
verdict. This is understandable because Westgate apparently does not want the court to focus on
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any evidence unfavorable to Westgate's view of the case. Further, Westgate argues legal theories
previously argued at earlier stages of this case. Again, this is understandable because Westgate
believes that if the court was wrong then, it is still wrong now. However, the court denies
Westgate5 s motion for judgment as a matter of law because the evidence is not insufficient to
support the jury verdict and for other reasons as discussed below.
First, Westgate did not provide admissible evidence, despite its many claims to the
contrary, that the Consumer information was stolen from Westgate. Further, assignments of
claims are not proof of bad faith, and are and should be allowed.
Second, the court already meticulously weighed and balanced the factors in deciding
whether to consolidate the claims of CPG. Westgate has presented no new arguments or case
law justifying reconsideration of this careful decision. Certainly, the striking similarity of the
Consumer claims supported the court's decision to consolidate. This determination comports
with judicial economy and efficiency and avoids unnecessary costs and delays. Further, CPG had
a right to show evidence of knowledge, intent and plan, pursuant to Rule of Evidence 404(b).
Westgate complained of the "mind-numbing redundancy" of CPG5 s witness testimony. Separate
trials for each individual claim would have been no less redundant; perhaps it would have more
redundant because witnesses may have been called to re-testify in each and every case. The court
was not and is not unmindful of the potential prejudice toward Westgate of requiring a jury to
consider many similar fraudulent acts committed against the Consumers in a single trial.
Westgate argues that its right to defend itself was sacrificed to judicial economy. This is not true.
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Westgate still had the right, and exercised thai i: ight, to defei id itself against 'the claims of C"P(!.
Just because Westgate lost at trial did not mean that it was not afforded an essential trial right.
1
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lJi.nl mi balance, the right decision (to consolidate) was made, and the court will

not disturb that decision.
Third, the economic loss rule did not bar CPG's fraud claims. The harm suffered by the
Consul tin* naif f>r\t»!id simple h< aehes <>l </eiih,tU us is evident from the testimony at trial and
other evidence adduced. Moreover, CPG provided clear and convincing evidence of ft;t»i<i
•-•>•* M»me Irani: . ommitted by Westgate's own employees. Also, there was sufficient
evidence of an agency relationship between Wt'\teate .1
Fourth, the evidence supported a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealinp

Hie (\m\\tnni\ »(«Tf -liif " Au ^oinj- iu 1J; 11 k ('ity without knowing all the material

terms and conditions of the promises made by Westgate, accordingly lual evidence hnther,
special damages of at least $500 was appropriate, as that amount was used to induce Consumers
to travel to Park City.
Fifth, the evidence supported a finding of legal malice, and the case law shows that it is
quite eoiiiiiHUi fur li.1111

punitive damage awards. See, e.g., Campbell v.

State Farm Mut. Auto, ins Co 2004 UT 23, 98 ?3d409ySmith v. Fairji n AVu lt\ hu

iM»Hir

4 1 K"\ i\ ul 11 H)A There is no evidence to show that the jury was inflamed or ignored its oath in
deciding that the punitive damage itwaid \\n\ '.uppmh 11 h\ meet (ess in intentional misconduct on
the part of Westgate. Further, any references to hundreds or thousands of misled Consumers w;is,
P a g e ' ^ r I II,

struck by the court and was not likely to prejudice the jury considering the weight of all the other
evidence against Westgate that was presented during the two-week tried.
Sixth, the punitive damages award is appropriate as determined by the jury based upon
the evidence at trial; therefore, the court will not disturb the award. Jury Instruction No. 76
contained the seven Crookston factors, and there is no evidence that the jury did not consider
these factors in fashioning the award. By any measure, Westgate's net wealth and gross revenues
were relatively large in comparison to the punitive damages award. Testimony at trial revealed
that Westgate Resorts was worth $500 million in 2007, and during the year before trial, Westgate
Resorts generated $1 billion in gross revenues. The jury was required to take into account the
relative wealth of Westgate Resorts. As to the nature of the scheme itself, evidence at trial
demonstrated that it was very profitable and extensive, and was perpetrated intentionally or at
least recklessly. The jury also should have considered the probability of future recurrence. This
is evident from the apparent lack of remorse of Westgate, which continues to insist on the
propriety of its actions to this day. Lack of remorse is a predictor of recidivism. Campbell, 2004
UT at ff 29, 35. Thus, it was proper for the jury to infer from the evidence that Westgate had a
calloused attitude toward the Consumers, and that such an attitude means that Westgate would be
willing to defraud others.
The seventh Crookston factor, the amount of actual damages awarded, appears to be the
most hotly contested factor between Westgate and CPG. The court has the authority to reduce
the punitive damages award if it is excessive and has been the result of passion or prejudice.
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However, the court here chooses not to disturb (lie ttimilivi damages maided In llie Mm True,
the United States Supreme Court stated that few awards exceeding the 9-to-l ratio are likely to
i >mi|n>rl s\ iflii due piniess, Sttiie I titm Mui Auto Im ("o v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 410
(2003), this court finds that the punitive damages award in this case d« r,s sat is IV liiur pr< KXSS.
Westgate's conduct was clearly reprehensible, and Westgate could have faced civil penalties for
fraudulent marketing ladii\s, im<In UtaM otii ^nnotaled Sedum V/ KM(a). See HMIV of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. SSV (1996).
I hi" compensator) damages are fairly nominal, "The smaller the compensatory damages,
the higher the ratio of punitives to compensatory damages lias It, U HI
objectives of awarding punitive damages." Bennett v. Reynolds, 242 S.W.3d 866, 904-05 (Tex
Ct. l-

"0'>"

ugh some states impose bright-line limits,

or "ceilings," to punitive damage awards, Utah is not such a state. "[Tjhe absolute ceiling
approach is a n i mechanical and could potentially defeat the very purpose of punitive damages."
Crookston, 817 P.2dat 809. Such aceilinf nuiiltl mil (filet htinnliil mmlm I, \K\

.JIIM:

>n me

defendants "could calculate their exposure to liability in advance." Id Further, and perhaps
more relevant to llir-> I\»M* "'absoitfti eatiii|.«N do 'ml piovuk1 I he flexibility to deal adequately
with the type of case that involves only minimal actual damages, but where the conduct * ii ilio
delendiinl is so flagrant as to justify a large punitive award." Id.
The United States Supreme t \ ,

, compensation but

principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct

LJUUI*,

I2U h.Ci. at 2621. Further,
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"heavier punitive awards have been thought to be justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect.
. . or when the value of injury and the corresponding compensatory award are small." Id at
2622.
In upholding the punitive damage award of $1 million, this court is aware that the award
far exceeds the presumptively acceptable 3-to-l ratio outlined in Crookston, The court bases this
deviation on the weight of many of the other Crookston factors. For example, as already
discussed, with the relatively high wealth of Westgate, a ratio within the commonly acceptable
range would hardly be a drop in the bucket. If punitives are meant to deter and punish, then a 3to-1 ratio imposed on Westgate would simply not achieve these purposes. Further, because it
appears that Westgate perpetrated the scheme on many unsuspecting victims, the nature of the
misconduct, as well as the facts and circumstances of the misconduct, does not weigh in
Westgate's favor. Because it was so difficult to detect many small-scale ifrauds in the aggregate,
the misbehavior of Westgate was highly likely to continue. As stated earlier, Westgate's
continued defiance and absence of remorse are key factors to predicting a recurrence of the
conduct. Further, although the parties were not in a fiduciary relationship, the Consumers placed
a degree of trust in Westgate which was clearly breached. Because of these factors, the court
upholds the award. Therefore, Westgate's alternative motion for a remittitur of the punitive
damages award is denied.
b.

CPG's Attorney Fees Memo is Denied.
CPG has pointed to no statute or contract authorizing or requiring an attorney fees award.
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No exceptions to this general'rule are relevant here Moirov • lln n ml iloe:< not (inJ "hat equity
demands an attorney fees award against Westgate. Further, the private attorney general doctrine
Minpl; i loos not a|i| I1, Main ul llie aiguments CPG made in favor of the private attorney general
doctrine also relate to its plea for this court to uphold the punitive damages jt w aid

11111 11 ie

issue does not need to be revisited. The goals of deterrence and punishment are met by the
punitive damages award.
Both parties are instructed to pay for their own costs and attorney fees.
c.

CPG's Costs Memo is Moot.
There was no Rule 54(b) entry of a final judgment M l'»«" time (he betli pat lies til' «l

pleadings concerning CPG's Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements. The Costs Memo is
now moot. \tt> co'.i1 nnl i|i«d)(n\niiinii;i in \d)n In 11*1 i is; ciiiiiied will amy be included in the
Supplemental Order and Judgment, based on this ruling, which is to be prepared by counsel for
< Tf i

Ruling and Order
Based on the foirjjoini,!' W estate'- I'omlimul Millions are Denied, ("f-t s Attorney Fees
Motion is Denied, and CPG's Costs Memo is moot. Counsel for CPG is specifically dir a
t

par,

supplemental Order and Judgment, which will contain a recital of the

award amounts consistent with the jury verdict, as well as any necessary costs and dis'bursements.
However, the court's decision today is to be treated as the final appealable order for the purposes

of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54, as this judgment conclusively adjudicates the claims, the
rights, and the liabilities of all parties. Finally, the court notes that CPG filed a Combined
Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and For Attorney Fees and Expenses and For Rule 54(b)
Certification of Judgment as Final, on March 29,2010. This ruling does not affect CPG's
recently filed Combined Motion. Unless and until a response is filed by Westgate, and/or a
Notice to Submit is filed by either party, the court does not address nor comment on CPG's
Combined Motion.

Dated this

&

day of L/^fr?/ ^

, 2010.

Judge Lynn W. Davis
Fourth Judicial District Court

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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L. Rich Humpherys, 1582
Karra J. Porter, 5223
Scot A. Boyd, 9503
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)323-5000
Facsimile: (801)355-3472
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant Consumer Protection Grou,
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

WRSKiATKRLSORIS, I II).
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENT \ i 111< 11H/ >\ i\ 11
JUDGMENT

vs.

SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,
Defendants.
f/20404068

SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
WESTGATERESOR IS I ID
Counterdefendant.

Division No. 8
Judge Lynn W. Davis

< •

Pursuant to this Court's Memorandum Decision and Rule54(b) Order (April 6, 2010)
(which is incorporated herein by reference), and having reviewed Consumer Protection Group,
LLC's present Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements, and for good cause appearing, it is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Judgment entered by this Court
December 11, 2008 for $11,516.79 in damages and $1,000,000.05 in punitive damages, is hereby
supplemented with an award of costs to Consumer Protection Group, LLC in the amount of
$15,623.55, for a grand total Judgment in favor of Consumer Protection Group, LLC against
Westgate Resorts, LTD in the amount of $1,027,140.39.
DATED this

/ ~ day of^prftr2010.
BY THE COURT:

/Judge Lynn;
Fourth Disi
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STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

21

™ n P -t,0li
Richard W. Epstein
(admittedpro hac vice)
Greenspoon Marder, P.A.
100 West Cypress Creek Road Ste. 700
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309
Richard.epstein@gmlaw.com
(954)491-1120

Todd Shaughnessy (6651)
Troy L.Booher (9419)
Snell & Wilmer L.LP.
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004
tshaughnessy@swlaw.com
tbooher@swlaw.com
(801) 257-1900
Attorneys for Plaintifi^Counterdefendant - Appellant
Westgate Resources, Ltd.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTGATE RESORTS, LTD.,
PlaintifB^Counterdefendant Appellant,
v.

SHAUN S. ADEL and CONSUMER
PROTECTION GROUP, LLC,

ORDER GRANTING
STIPULATED MOTION TO CERTIFY
JUDGMENTS AS FINAL PURSUANT TO
RULE 54(b)
District Court No. 020404068
Honorable Lynn W. Davis

Defendants/Counterclaimants Appellee.
Having reviewed the Stipulated Motion to Certify Judgments as Final Pursuant to Rule
54(b) (ccMotion"), and for good cause shown:
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS:
The following 15 sets of claimants assigned their claims to Consumer Protection Group,
LLC: George Baty, Holly and Jon Beck, Howard and Karen Brandt, Stephen and Kristy Brower,
Darren and Irene Davis, David and Kristen Detienne, Larry and Sherrill Dorius, Diane Eastman,
Robert and Diane Ellis, Kurtis and Karen Heser, Susan Hubbar, Mark and Luanne Huntington,

11598774

Byard and Joan Price, Rodney Sorensen, and Gregory and Relda White. Those 15 sets of
claimants tried their claims to a jury, which resulted in a judgment entered December 11,2008.
There are other parties whose claims were not resolved in the December 11,2008 judgment But
for the claims of the other parties, the judgments against the 15 sets of claimants would be final
for purposes of appeal. Thus, there is no just reason to delay any appeal of issues involving the
15 sets of claims because they are distinctfromthe remaining claims.
THE COURT THEREFORE HEREBY FINDS AND ORDERS:
1.

The Motion is GRANTED;

2.

Because issues raised in the post-trial motions involving the 15 sets of claimants

are currently before the Utah Supreme Court, there is no just reason to delay having any other
issues related to the 15 sets of claimants resolved by the Utah Supreme Court at the same time.
3.

The judgments entered December 11,2008, and May 10,2010, as well as all

previous orders affecting the rights of the 15 sets of claimants whose claims are resolved in the
December 11,2008 judgment, are hereby certified as final for purposes of appeal under Rule
54(b).
DATED this

/

JM^L/ , 2010.
°f y^4^>

day of

BY THE COURT:

le Lynn W. Davis
r
Fourth District Court Judge

11598774
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j

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Christensen & Jensen PC

lumpher
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Defendant/
Counterclaimant - Appellee
Consumer Protection Group, LLC

11598774
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 17th day of June, 2010, the foregoing [proposed] ORDER
GRANTING STIPULATED MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENTS AS FINAL PURSUANT
TO RULE 54(b)was sent via first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
L. Rich Humpherys
Karra J. Porter
Christensen & Jensen
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AMENDMENTS
AMENDMENT 14
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USCS Const. Amend J4, § 1
Sec. 1. [Citizens of the United States.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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TITLE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 11. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES
Utah Code Ann. §13-11-17

(2001)

§ 13-11-17. Actions by enforcing authority

(1) The enforcing authority may bring an action:
(a) to obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this chapter;
(b) to enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has violated, is violating, or is otherwise
likely to violate this chapter; and
(c) to recover, for each violation, actual damages, or obtain relief under Subsection (2)(b), on behalf of consumers
who complained to the enforcing authority within a reasonable time after it instituted proceedings under this chapter.
(2) (a) The enforcing authority may bring a class action on behalf of consumers for the actual damages caused by
an act or practice specified as violating this chapter in a rule adopted by the enforcing authority under Subsection
13-11-8(2) before the consumer transactions on which the action is based, or declared to violate Section 13-11-4 or
13-11-5 by final judgment of courts of general jurisdiction and appellate courts of this state that was either reported
officially or made available for public dissemination under Subsection 13-1 l-7(l)(c) by the enforcing authority ten days
before the consumer transactions on which the action is based, or, with respect to a supplier who agreed to it, was
prohibited specifically by the terms of a consent judgment that became final before the consumer transactions on which
the action is based.
(b) (i) On motion of the enforcing authority and without bond in an action under this subsection, the court may
make appropriate orders, including appointment of a master or receiver or sequestration of assets, but only if it appears
that the defendant is threatening or is about to remove, conceal, or dispose of the defendant's property to the damage of
persons for whom relief is requested. An appropriate order may include an order:
(A) to reimburse consumers found to have been damaged;
(B) to carry out a transaction in accordance with consumers* reasonable expectations;
(C) to strike or limit the application of unconscionable clauses of contracts to avoid an unconscionable result;
or
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(D) to grant other appropriate relief,
(ii) The court may assess the expenses of a master or receiver against a supplier.
(c) If an act or practice that violates this chapter unjustly enriches a supplier and damages can be computed with
reasonable certainty, damages recoverable on behalf of consumers who cannot be located with due diligence shall be
transferred to the state treasurer pursuant to Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed Property Act
(d) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of this chapter resulted from a bona
fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error, recovery under
Subsection (2) is limited to the amount, if any, by which the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation.
(e) An action may not be brought by the enforcing authority under Subsection (2) more than two years after the
occurrence of a violation of this chapter.
(3) (a) The enforcing authority may terminate an investigation or an action other than a class action upon
acceptance of the supplier's written assurance of voluntary compliance with this chapter. Acceptance of an assurance
may be conditioned on a commitment to reimburse consumers or take other appropriate corrective action.
(b) An assurance is not evidence of a prior violation of this chapter. Unless an assurance has been rescinded by
agreement of the parties or voided by a court for good cause, subsequent failure to comply with the terms of an
assurance is prima facie evidence of a violation.
(4) (a) In addition to other penalties and remedies set out under this chapter, and in addition to its other enforcement
powers under Title 13, Chapter 2, Division of Consumer Protection, the division director may issue a cease and desist
order and impose an administrative fine of up to $1,000 for each violation of this chapter.
(b) All money received through administrative fines imposed under this section shall be deposited in the
Consumer Protection Education and Training Fund created by Section 13-2-8.
HISTORY: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 17; 1983, ch. 58, § 8; 1993, ch. 4, § 55; 1995, ch. 198, § 2; 1995, ch. 237, § 2.
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Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19 (2001)
§ 13-11-19. Actions by consumer

(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an adequate remedy at law, a consumer may bring an
action to:
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this chapter; and
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has violated, is violating, or is likely to
violate this chapter.
(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter may recover, but not in a class action,
actual damages or $2,000, whichever is greater, plus court costs.
(3) Whether a consumer seeks or is entitled to recover damages or has an adequate remedy at law, he may bring a
class action for declaratory judgment, an injunction, and appropriate ancillary relief against an act or practice that
violates this chapter.
(4) (a) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter may bring a class action for the actual
damages caused by an act or practice specified as violating this chapter by a rule adopted by the enforcing authority
under Subsection 13-11-8(2) before the consumer transactions on which the action is based, or declared to violate
Section 13-11-4 or 13-11-5 by a final judgment of the appropriate court or courts of general jurisdiction and appellate
courts of this state that was either officially reported or made available for public dissemination under Subsection
13-1 l-7(l)(c) by the enforcing authority ten days before the consumer transactions on which the action is based, or with
respect to a supplier who agreed to it, was prohibited specifically by the terms of a consent judgment which became
final before the consumer transactions on which the action is based.
(b) If an act or practice that violates this chapter unjustly enriches a supplier and the damages can be computed
with reasonable certainty, damages recoverable on behalf of consumers who cannot be located with due diligence shall
be transferred to the state treasurer pursuant to Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed Property Act.
(c) If a supplier shows by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of this chapter resulted from a bona
fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error, recovery under this
section is limited to the amount, if any, in which the supplier was unjustly enriched by the violation.
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(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may award to the prevailing party a
reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work reasonably performed if:
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this chapter has brought or maintained an action
he knew to be groundless; or a supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this chapter; and
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or required by the court to be settled under
Subsection 13-1 l-21(l)(a).
(6) Except for consent judgment entered before testimony is taken, a final judgment in favor of the enforcing
authority under Section 13-11-17 is admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts on which it is based in later
proceedings under this section against the same person or a person in privity with him.
(7) When a judgment under this section becomes final, the prevailing party shall mail a copy to the enforcing
authority for inclusion in the public file maintained under Subsection 13-1 l-7(l)(e).
(8) An action under this section must be brought within two years after occurrence of a violation of this chapter, or
within one year after the termination of proceedings by the enforcing authority with respect to a violation of this
chapter, whichever is later. When a supplier sues a consumer, he may assert as a counterclaim any claim under this
chapter arising out of the transaction on which suit is brought.
HISTORY: L. 1973, ch. 188, § 19; 1983, ch. 58, § 9; 1993, ch. 4, § 56; 1995, ch. 198, § 3.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1605 (2010)
§ 76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by a pattern of unlawful activity — Double damages — Costs, including
attorney fees — Arbitration — Agency — Burden of proof — Actions by attorney general or county attorney — Dismissal
— Statute of limitations ~ Authorized orders of district court

(1) A person injured in his person, business, or property by a person engaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of
Section 76-10-1603 may sue in an appropriate district court and recover twice the damages he sustains, regardless of
whether:
(a) the injury is separate or distinct from the injury suffered as a result of the acts or conduct constituting the
pattern of unlawful conduct alleged as part of the cause of action; or
(b) the conduct has been adjudged criminal by any court of the state or of the United States.
(2) A party who prevails on a cause of action brought under this section recovers the cost of the suit, including
reasonable attorney fees.
(3) All actions arising under this section which are grounded in fraud are subject to arbitration under Title 78B,
Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act.
(4) In all actions under this section, a principal is liable for actual damages for harm caused by an agent acting
within the scope of either his employment or apparent authority. A principal is liable for double damages only if the
pattern of unlawful activity alleged and proven as part of the cause of action was authorized, solicited, requested,
commanded, undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or a high managerial agent acting
within the scope of his employment.
(5) In all actions arising under this section, the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence.
(6) The attorney general, county attorney, or, if within a prosecution district, the district attorney may maintain
actions under this section on behalf of the state, the county, or any person injured by a person engaged in conduct
forbidden by any provision of Section 76-10-1603y to prevent, restrain, or remedy injury as defined in this section and
may recover the damages and costs allowed by this section.
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(7) In all actions under this section, the elements of each claim or cause of action shall be stated with particularity
against each defendant.
(8) If an action, claim, or counterclaim brought or asserted by a private party under this section is dismissed prior to
trial or disposed of on summary judgment, or if it is determined at trial that there is no liability, the prevailing party
shall recover from the party who brought the action or asserted the claim or counterclaim the amount of its reasonable
expenses incurred because of the defense against the action, claim, or counterclaim, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
(9) An action or proceeding brought under this section shall be commenced within three years after the conduct
prohibited by Section 76-10-1603 terminates or the cause of action accrues, whichever is later. This provision
supersedes any limitation to the contrary.
(10) (a) In any action brought under this section, the district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain, or remedy
injury as defined by this section by issuing appropriate orders after making provisions for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) Before liability is determined in any action brought under this section, the district court may:
(i) issue restraining orders and injunctions;
(ii) require satisfactory performance bonds or any other bond it considers appropriate and necessary in
connection with any property or any requirement imposed upon a party by the court; and
(iii) enter any other order the court considers necessary and proper.
(c) After a determination of liability, the district court may, in addition to granting the relief allowed in
Subsection (1), do any one or all of the following:
(i) order any person to divest himself of any interest in or any control, direct or indirect, of any enterprise;
(ii) impose reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including prohibiting
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, to the extent the Utah Constitution
and the Constitution of the United States permit; or
(iii) order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
(d) However, if an action is brought to obtain any relief provided by this section, and if the conduct prohibited by
Section 76-10-1603 has for its pattern of unlawful activity acts or conduct illegal under Section 76-10-1204,
76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court may not enter any order that would amount to a prior restraint on the
exercise of an affected party's rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or Article 1,
Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution. The court shall, upon the request of any affected party, and upon the notice to all
parties, prior to the issuance of any order provided for in this subsection, and at any later time, hold hearings as
necessary to determine whether any materials at issue are obscene or pornographic and to determine if there is probable
cause to believe that any act or conduct alleged violates Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222.
In making itsfindingsthe court shall be guided by the same considerations required of a court making similar findings
in criminal cases brought under Section 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, including, but not limited
to, the definitions in Sections 76-10-1201, 76-10-1203, and 76-10-1216, and the exemptions in Section 76-10-1226.
HISTORY: C. 1953, § 76-10-1605, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 238, § 5; 1989, ch. 22, § 46; 1993, ch. 38, § 84; 2008, ch.
3, § 244.
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Rule 42. Consolidation; separate trials
(a) Consolidation. — When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may
order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and
it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(1) A motion to consolidate cases shall be heard by the judge assigned to the first case filed. Notice of a motion to
consolidate cases shall be given to all parties in each case. The order denying or granting the motion shall be filed in
each case.
(2) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case number of the first case filed shall be used for all subsequent
papers and the case shall be heard by the judge assigned to the first case. The presiding judge may assign the case to
another judge for good cause.
(b) Separate trials. — The court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims,
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 2003
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment
(a) Grounds. - Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all
or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings
of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any
general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) Time for motion. — A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the
judgment.
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. — When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or
(4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time
within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may
permit reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. ~ Not later than 10 days after entry ofjudgment the court of its own initiative may order
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a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on morion of a party, and in the order shall specify
the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. — A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than
10 days after entry of the judgment.

